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Abstract 
Decreasing physical pain, increasing emotional wellbeing, and improving 
physical health are just some of the ways placebos have affected people’s physiological 
and psychological health (Crum & Langer, 2007; Kirsch & Sapirstein, 1999; 
Montgomery & Kirsch, 1997). Recently, Clifasefi, Garry, Harper, Sharman, and 
Sutherland (2007) demonstrated that a memory placebo called R273 could even reduce 
people’s susceptibility to misleading information. Yet how could a substance with no 
physiologically active properties affect memory performance? That is the overarching 
question of this thesis.  
In order to monitor the sources of information about the past, and in order to 
remember future tasks and actions, people can either use an effortful monitoring 
process, or they can rely on their usual, automatic and effortless memory processes. 
Typically, the more monitoring that people use, the better their memory performance 
(Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993; Einstein et al., 2005). In this thesis, over three 
experiments, I examined how a placebo might affect the way people monitor 
information, thus improving aspects of retrospective and prospective memory. 
Experiment 1 examined whether R273 reduces people’s susceptibility to the 
misinformation effect by leading them to switch from their habitual, automatic, and easy 
source monitoring to more deliberate and effortful source monitoring. To examine this 
question I used Clifasefi et al.’s (2007) sham drug procedure and then ran subjects 
through a three-stage misinformation experiment (Loftus, Miller, & Burns, 1978). The 
results of Experiments 1 suggest that R273 did not affect effortful monitoring during 
the post event information (PEI), but did affect effortful monitoring during the 
memory test.  
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Experiment 2 aimed to find further evidence that R273 affects people’s 
monitoring during the memory test. To address this question, all subjects were told that 
they had received an inactive drug before they took part in the first two stages of the 
misinformation effect paradigm. Immediately before taking the memory test, however, I 
falsely told some people that they had actually received R273. The primary finding of 
Experiment 2 added support to the idea that R273 affects subjects source monitoring 
during the memory test: Told Drug subjects were less misled than their Told Inactive 
counterparts.  
Finally, Experiment 3 further examined whether R273 leads people to use 
effortful monitoring, but did so using a prospective memory task, whose underlying 
memory processes align closely with those of source monitoring. The results showed 
that Told Drug subjects were slower to perform an ongoing and concurrent task, yet 
had better prospective memory performance than Told Inactive subjects. These results 
suggested that R273 lead Told Drug subjects’ to use more effortful monitoring.  
In conclusion, the results suggest that the sham cognitive enhancing placebo 
R273 improves people’s ability to resist misleading suggestion, and perform prospective 
memory tasks because it leads them to use more effortful monitoring. 
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Chapter 1 
 Placebos and Memory 
The ability of an inert substance to produce genuine physiological or 
psychological changes demonstrates the perplexing phenomena of the placebo effect 
(Kirsch, 1985; 1997; Marlatt & Rohsenow, 1980; Stewart-Williams, 2004; Stewart-
Williams & Podd, 2004). Yet as puzzling as the placebo effect may be, it is robust: 
administered in a variety of guises placebos have been able to soothe nasty coughs, lead 
us to engage in behaviours we may otherwise keep to ourselves, and even aid weight 
loss (Cheong & Nagoshi, 1999; Crum & Langer, 2007; Eccles, 2002; 2006).  
Yet the notion of using placebos for treatment, healing and enhancement is far 
from new. According to Shapiro and Shapiro (1997a), "the history of medicine is 
essentially the history of the placebo effect" (p.13). Evidence suggests that ancient 
civilisations—including the Assyrians, Greeks and Egyptians—possessed over 4000 
"drugs" to treat a range of maladies. With only a handful of exceptions, however, the 
majority of these drugs were placebos (Shapiro & Shapiro, 1997a, 1997b).  
In the 16th and 17th centuries the medical landscape was much the same. The 
English, French and German pharmacopoeias listed an extensive collection of 
nauseating and stomach churning treatments such as perspiration, human placenta and 
the saliva of a fasting man (Shapiro & Shapiro, 1997a). Even during the 1930s and 
1940s, according to Spiro (1997) the use of placebos for medical treatment was still 
prominent. Physicians regularly administered placebos to patients in order to placate 
them, and this practice was not only viewed as ethical, but was encouraged. Drug 
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catalogues sold pills labelled as placebos and actively marketed some of them as having 
the ability to "perk up anyone who just read the label" p.39).  
Today, according to a recent survey by Tilburt, Emanuel, Kaptchuk and Curlin 
(2008), physicians still regularly administer placebos to their patients: a survey of 679 
physicians found that approximately 50% administer placebos on a regular basis while 
62% believe that the practice of administering placebos is ethical. However, placebos 
now play a part in more than just a medical setting. They have established themselves as 
vital agents of control in clinical drug trials and are recognised as complex psychological 
phenomena worthy of study in their own right (Kirsch, 1999; Marlatt & Rohsenow, 
1980; Price, Finniss & Benedetti, 2008). For example, two comprehensive meta-analytic 
studies by Kirsch and colleagues show that placebos are powerful agents in reducing 
depression (Kirsch & Sapirstein, 1999; Kirsch et al., 2008). In the most recent of these 
studies, Kirsch et al. (2008) conducted a meta-analysis on a class of selective serotonin 
reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs)—the new generation of antidepressants. Under the 
Freedom of Information Act, Kirsch et al. obtained data on all clinical trials between 
1987 and 1999 submitted to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), including some 
that were previously unpublished due to inconclusive or null results. Overall, Kirsch et 
al. found that the benefit of the antidepressants over placebos did not meet the 
necessary criteria of clinical significance as laid out by the UK's National Institute of 
Clinical Excellence (either a three point difference in depression score on the Hamilton 
Rating Scale for Depression, or a standardised mean difference in effectiveness between 
placebo and antidepressant treatments of at least .50).  
Thus, recent research suggests that the placebo effect is a modern day, real-
world phenomenon. As such, the majority of psychological research on the placebo 
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effect has addressed why a substance that possesses no active or physiological powers 
can alter and affect such a vast range of behaviours. 
Theoretical Underpinnings: What causes the placebo effect?  
While many theories attempt to account for the placebo effect—most beyond 
the scope of this thesis—the two leading explanations in the placebo literature are 
conditioning theory and expectancy theory (Ader, 1997; Kirsch, 1997; 1999, Stewart-Williams 
& Podd, 2004).  
Conditioning Theory 
The conditioning account of the placebo effect draws heavily on some of the 
basic premises of classical conditioning, and provides compelling evidence as to how 
placebos produce physiological responses in humans and animals, which mimic those of 
an active drug.  
The central tenet of classical conditioning is that people and animals 
demonstrate reflexive unconditioned responses (UR) to certain unconditioned stimuli 
(US). For example, some people may suffer skin irritation (UR) when they eat peanuts 
(US). Yet if an UR and US are repeatedly paired, otherwise neutral stimuli—such as the 
packaging that the peanuts come in—can also become associated with the UR and US. 
Subsequently, neutral stimuli become conditioned stimuli (CS) when they are able to 
produce responses that mimic those of the UR (irritation). The response produced by 
the CS is the conditioned response (CR). Thus, early accounts of classical conditioning 
viewed it as occurring through the continuous parings of stimuli that were presented 
together at the same time (temporal contiguity), and the strength of the effect was 
thought to be a function of the number of times the CS and the US were paired 
(Stewart-Williams & Podd, 2004). 
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In classical conditioning terms, the placebo effect occurs because people learn 
to associate the pharmacologically active treatment (the US) and its pharmacological 
effects (the UR) with neutral stimuli. For example, it has been suggested that features of 
active medical treatments such as pill casing, taste, or even the sight of a syringe may 
become paired with the US (Ader, 1997; Stewart-Williams & Podd, 2004; 
Wickramasekera, 1980). If a strong association between the US and the neutral stimuli is 
formed, the neutral stimuli may elicit a similar response to the active medication.  
Much of the classical conditioning research on the placebo effect comes from 
the animal literature (Ader, 1997; Stewart-Williams & Podd, 2004). A range of studies 
from the 1970s and 1980s show that under placebo administration, animals display 
behavioural and physiological changes that mimic the effects of active drugs (Pihl & 
Altmas, 1971; Ader & Cohen, 1975; Numan et al., 1975; Michel & Tirelli, 2002). For 
example, Ader and Cohen (1975) paired a sugar solution with an immunosuppressant. 
After a number of pairings, the sugar solution alone decreased the rat’s immune 
responses. Similarly, Numan et al. (1975) repeatedly injected rats with morphine but 
paired the morphine injections with a tone. When they stopped giving morphine to the 
rats, the rats experienced withdrawal symptoms. Yet, Numan et al. found that 
presenting the tone reduced their withdrawal symptoms.  
Likewise, research using human subjects suggests that conditioning might 
explain why people who take placebos report less pain, fewer symptoms of 
schizophrenia, and the stimulating effects of caffeine (Voudouri, Peck, & Coleman, 
1985; Greenberg & Roth, 1966; Knowles, 1963). For example, in a series of studies by 
Voudouris and colleagues, people learned to respond to a placebo analgesic (Voudouris 
et al., 1985; 1989; 1990). Voudouris et al. administered uncomfortable stimulations using 
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an iontophoretic pain generator. The generator drives ions into the skils causing a 
prickling sensations at lower levels of stimulation and a cramping sensation at higher 
intensities. Voudourise paired the shocks with a placebo analgesic cream. Over a 
number of trials, Voudouris et al. surreptitiously reduced the intensity of the shocks, 
giving subjects the impression that the cream was effective. Finally, when Voudouris et 
al. reinstated the shocks to their original intensity, subjects reported less pain when the 
placebo cream was applied (Voudouris et al., 1985; 1989; 1990). 
While the classical conditioning account provides a compelling explanation of 
placebo effects in animals, and some placebo effects in humans, more modern 
approaches view it less as an automatic, non-cognitive process, and one which can be 
mediated and influenced by cognitions, beliefs and desires (Montgomery & Kirsch, 
1997; Rescorla, 1988; Stewart-Williams & Podd, 2004). For example, Montgomery and 
Kirsch (1997) examined whether Voudouris et al.'s (1985) placebo analgesic effect—a 
heavily cited example of classical conditioning in humans—was mediated by subjects' 
beliefs that the analgesic cream would reduce their pain. In a early account of classical 
conditioning and the placebo effect, beliefs should not matter; simply administering the 
cream and reducing the intensity of the shocks over trials should result in subjects' 
forming an association between the cream and decreased pain. But, Montgomery and 
Kirsch reasoned that if people were informed that the pain was being reduced, it would 
eliminate the effectiveness of the placebo cream. That is what they found: telling some 
subjects about the lowering of the shock intensity eliminated the conditioning, and thus 
the placebo effect.  
Furthermore, some studies show placebo responses that work in the opposite 
direction of the conditioned response. For example, the pharmacological effect of 
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alcohol is to decrease sexual arousal, yet when given placebo alcohol, people tend to 
report increased sexual arousal—a response opposite to what a conditioned response 
should be (Fillmore & Vogel-Sprott, 1992; Hull & Bond, 1986, Kirsch & Weixel, 1988; 
Kirsch, 1985). Perhaps, some have speculated, these kinds of opposite responses are 
evidence of a kind of physiological compensation, and the body preparing for receiving 
an active drug while trying to maintain homeostasis. For example, the direct 
physiological effect of taking insulin is to reduce the level of glucose in the blood. But 
when placebo insulin is administered in place of real insulin, the body compensates by 
increasing glucose production (Siegel, 1972). However other opposite responses are 
purely social, and cannot be explained by physiological compensation. For example, 
studies show that when people drink placebo alcohol, they behave in line with social 
expectations or beliefs about how alcohol affects them such as displaying increased 
aggression or an increased tendency to laugh out loud at humorous material (Cherek, 
Steinberg, & Manno, 1985; Vuchinich, Tucker, & Sobell, 1979). On the other hand, 
pharmacologically active alcohol administered in the guise of a placebo does not induce 
these behaviours.  
In sum, evidence suggests that classical conditioning may explain the occurrence 
of some placebo effects—especially those demonstrated in animals. But, the 
conditioning account of placebo effects in humans cannot be reconciled with placebo 
effect data without taking beliefs into account. The theory that has attempted to address 
the shortcomings of conditioning theory is expectancy theory.  
Expectancy Theory  
According to expectancy theory, the placebo effect occurs because people hold 
specific beliefs—response expectancies—about how they expect to respond to certain 
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stimuli (Kirsch, 1985; 1997). Kirsch defines response expectancies as self-confirming 
beliefs that certain external events or stimuli will produce certain types of involuntary 
behaviours—such as joy, anger, alertness, or fear (Kirsch, 1985; 1997; Kirsch & Lynn, 
1999). When response expectancies are triggered, the behaviours that occur work 
almost like a domino effect: as the first domino falls over, the others fall in automatic 
response. In the placebo effect, the first behavioural domino is "pushed over" or 
triggered by the act of taking a substance believed to be active and consequently, other 
behaviours that lead to the expected outcome occur automatically without intention or 
awareness (Kirsch & Lynn, 1999). When the expected behavioural outcome ensues, 
people misattribute the behaviour as being caused by the placebo instead of being 
caused by themselves (Marlatt & Rohsenow, 1980).  
A number of studies lend support to the expectancy account of the placebo 
effect. They show that what subjects are led to expect about their substance, or the 
beliefs they already hold, generally predicts the direction of the placebo response 
(Fillmore, Carscadden & Vogel-Sprott, 1998; Fillmore & Vogel-Sprott, 1992; Kirsch & 
Wiexel, 1988; Montgomery & Kirsch, 1997). Fillmore and Vogel-Sprott for example, 
administered placebo caffeine to all subjects but varied what subjects were told about 
their substance. Specifically, they told some subjects that caffeine would enhance their 
performance on a basic motor skills task; they told other subjects that caffeine would 
impair their performance. Another group of subjects—the control group—received no 
substance. Fillmore and Vogel-Sprott found that the information that subjects received 
about the placebo predicted the direction of their response: subjects who expected 
impairment performed worse than the control group while subjects who expected 
enhancement performed better than the control group.  
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Similarly, Fillmore et al. (1998) measured subjects’ expectations about the 
impairing effects of alcohol and then gave them alcohol, placebo alcohol, or no 
substance. All subjects then took part in a timed information-processing task. The 
results showed that subjects performed the most poorly on the task when they received 
actual alcohol. Yet interestingly, subjects who expected more impairment performed 
poorly under alcohol, and under placebo alcohol. When no beverage was received 
subjects’ expectancies yielded no effect on their information processing performance.  
More recently, research suggests that even in the absence of administering an 
actual substance, expectation alone can alter behaviour. Crum and Langer (2007) 
examined whether people who expected that their daily work was good for their health 
would reflect this expectation in the form of measurable and positive health outcomes. 
To address their question, Crum and Langer told a group of hotel room attendants that 
their daily work was beneficial for their health. In addition, some attendants were 
provided with specific examples of how their daily activities benefited their health and 
how many calories each activity burned. Another group of attendants did not receive 
this specific information. Both groups had their general health behaviours and 
physiological well being measured in two sessions: first at the initial information session 
and then again, four weeks later. The results suggested that providing people with the 
expectation that their work was healthy resulted in objective and positive health 
outcomes: the informed attendants decreased their body fat percentage, blood pressure, 
body weight and body-mass-index.  
In sum, research suggests that people’s expectancies are a powerful determinant 
of the placebo effect. Thus, in the design and administration of placebo effect studies, 
the importance of accounting and controlling for expectancies has been recognised.  
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Methods for studying the placebo effect 
Some of the earliest controlled drug trials recognised the important role that 
people’s beliefs and expectations play in shaping behaviour (Gold, Kwitt & Otto, 1937; 
Shapiro & Shapiro, 1997). As such, researchers have primarily used single blind and 
double blind trials in an attempt to account for subject and patient expectancies.  
Single Blind Trials (SBTs)  
In single blind trials (SBTs), subjects are unaware of whether the substance they 
are taking is active or inactive. An assumption of SBTs is that if subjects do not know 
the true contents of their pill, expectancies cannot bias their behaviour. But while single 
blind trials aim to control for subjects’ expectancies, one criticism of the design is that 
they fail to control for the expectancies and biases of the experimenter (Shapiro & 
Shapiro, 1997).  
Rosenthal and colleagues conducted seminal research on whether one person's 
expectations could influence another person's behaviour. In one particularly famous 
study, Rosenthal and Jacobsen (1968) gave school children an IQ test, telling their 
teachers that the results of the test would predict which children would "bloom" the 
most during the school year: 20% of children were picked at random and pointed out to 
the teachers. At the end of the school year, when the children took the test again, those 
who showed the most improvement were the children who the teachers had expected to 
improve.  
In a more direct study of experimenter bias effects, Rosenthal (1966) asked 
experimenters to show subjects various photos of people’s faces, asking them to rate 
these faces on the degree of success or failure each person was experiencing. Rosenthal 
led some of the experimenters to believe that certain subjects’ ratings would average 
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approximately 5 on a scale of -10 (extreme failure) to +10 (extreme success), while 
certain others would average around -5. Yet, unbeknown to the experimenters, the 
photos had previously been rated as neutral. The results demonstrated the biasing 
effects of the experimenters’ beliefs on subjects’ ratings: when experimenters were led 
to expect a certain range of responses, they typically obtained those responses.  
Thus, with the research suggesting that the expectations of the experimenter can 
exert powerful biasing effects over subject’ behaviours, a method needed to be 
established that took these expectations into account. The method that addresses this 
concern is the double blind trial (Gold et al., 1937; Marlatt & Rohsenhow, 1980).  
Double Blind Trials (DBTs)  
Double Blind Trials (DBTs) became the gold standard of placebo drug testing, 
or as Marlatt and Rohsenow put it, “the hallmark of design excellence” (pp. 163, 1980). 
Indeed, a literature search of the PubMed database suggests they still are: a search of 
articles that contain the phrase "double-blind placebo" produced 3005 articles published 
within the last 5 years. In DBTs neither the experimenter nor the subject is aware of 
what treatment the subject receives. Consequently, the design aims to remove both the 
subject and experimenter’s expectations from the experimental setting.  
Gold et al. (1937) carried out one of the earliest DBTs. They were in the middle 
of carrying out a single blind study to compare the effectiveness of Xanthines—a 
popular drug that people believed ameliorated cardiac pain—to a lactose placebo, when 
they discovered that some of the physicians were asking patients leading questions 
about the effectiveness of their treatment. When Gold et al. inspected the results it 
became obvious that the patients’ ratings of pain were biased by these questions. To 
address this issue, Gold et al. developed the DBT so that neither the physicians nor 
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patients knew when placebos were being administered in place of the Xanthines. After 
changing the design, Gold et al. found that patients were unable to distinguish between 
what they had received and, as a result, it was concluded that Xanthines were not 
effective at reducing cardiac pain.  
Yet even though DBTs are designed to account for both subject and 
experimenter expectancies, there are still some inherent problems with the procedure. 
First, researchers have questioned whether the double blind procedure is actually blind. 
Subjects may be "unblinded" to their drug condition if there is any obvious difference 
between the placebo and active drug (Desbiens, 2002; Shapiro and Shapiro, 1997a). For 
example, equating the placebo and active drug on taste, shape, colour and size is a 
difficult task. Some drugs, such as zinc, have a strong and particular taste. Matching a 
placebo to this taste is difficult (Fair & Gwaltney, 1987). In addition, active drugs often 
produce undesirable side effects. If the side effects are not mimicked in the placebo, 
both the subject and experimenter may be "unblinded" to the contents of the drug 
(Debiens, 2002).  
Marlatt and Rohsenow (1980) identified a second problem regarding DBTs: 
until the 1980s it was common for subjects to be unaware that a placebo might be 
administered during the drug trial. Yet not revealing to patients that they may receive a 
placebo opens up an ethical quagmire. Patients who receive placebos without their 
knowledge, and who do not have their symptoms or condition improve, may conclude 
that their condition cannot be treated and experience feelings of hopelessness, fear and 
anxiety. One way of addressing this ethical dilemma is to inform subjects that there is a 
chance that they will receive a placebo. However, informing subjects that they might 
receive a placebo raises a second issue: this situation is not a good proxy of what 
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happens in a clinical setting or real-world situation (Kirsch & Weixel, 1988). For 
example, when people go to the chemist to pick up a prescription, they are not told that 
their medication may be active or may be a placebo. If this situation did occur, it is likely 
that people would spend a significant amount of time trying to guess whether the 
medication was active or inactive by scrutinising and interpreting every behaviour with 
caution, eventually coming to a decision. According to Sutton (1991), once people have 
made a decision about what they think they have received, people will most likely divide 
themselves into three distinct groups. In one group, people will think that they have 
been given the active drug, another group will think they have been given the placebo, 
and a third group will remain undecided. According to the expectancy account of 
placebo effects, the decision they make will trigger their response expectancies. That 
response expectancy then sets in motion the chain of automatic behaviours that lead to 
a self-confirming outcome and this outcome may be at odds or in accordance with what 
they actually received. Consequently, any difference or lack of difference observed 
between the active and placebo conditions could be due to the contents of the 
substance or due to subjects’ expectations.  
Thus, even though SBTs and DBTs attempt to control for both subject and 
experimenter expectations, in trying to eliminate them altogether they are introduced as 
confounds. A procedure called the Balanced Placebo Design (BPD; Marlatt and 
Rohsenow, 1980) addresses the limitations of SBTs and DBTs, and in doing so provides 
a direct measure of expectancy in the placebo effect.  
The Balanced Placebo Design  
The design of the BPD is 2 x 2: subjects are told that they will either receive the 
active drug or the inactive placebo and what they receive either matches or does not 
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match this information (see Figure 1.1). This design allows the effects of the active drug 
and expectancy to be targeted both in isolation from, as well as in combination with, 
one another.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1. An illustration of the Balanced Placebo Design: subjects receive an active or inactive 
substance and what they are told matches or does not match this information 
 
Placebo Effects and the BPD 
Research using the BPD provides an accumulating body of knowledge regarding 
the types of behaviours that are susceptible to placebo effects, and offers further 
evidence that what people are told about their substance is an important predictor of 
the behaviours elicited under placebo administration (Kirsch & Weixel, 1988). A review 
of the literature follows.  
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Social Behaviours  
Research using the BPD plays a key role in identifying a number of placebo 
effects that are mediated by people’s expectancies, and typically, the majority of these 
behaviours are social. Social behaviours have been targeted for two reasons. First, 
placebos give people an outlet for explaining away their social misdemeanours (Hull & 
Bond, 1986; Marlatt & Rohsenow, 1980). That is, a placebo gives people an excuse to 
engage in otherwise undesirable behaviour because it removes the onus of blame from 
the person demonstrating the behaviour and places it on an external cause—the placebo 
(e.g. "it wasn't my fault I behaved liked that, it was the alcohol"). Second, people hold 
relatively strong views, expectations and behavioural scripts about how certain 
substances, like alcohol and nicotine, affect their social behaviours. For example, studies 
show that people’s expectations about alcohol—that it decreases stress and tension, 
improves mood and increases positive social interaction—are a factor in maintaining 
their drinking (Cooper, 1994; Labrie, Hummer and Pedersen, 2007). Additionally, these 
beliefs are social in nature as they are often culturally specific (MacAndrew & Edgerton, 
1969). Thus, research using the BPD has tended to focus on socially popular substances 
such as nicotine and alcohol.  
Smoking. Wesnes, Revell & Warburton (1983) found that a cohort of college 
students reported that because smoking helped their concentration and arousal, they 
increased the amount they smoked during exam weeks. The results of this study suggest 
that people’s expectations about nicotine may provide an excuse for them to increase or 
maintain their smoking behaviours.  
To examine whether smoking increases concentration and arousal because of 
nicotine or because of expectancies about nicotine, Kelemen and Kaighobadi (2007) 
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used the BPD to compare people’s expectations about nicotine with its pharmacological 
effects. Kelemen and Kaighobadi told some subjects that they would receive cigarettes 
containing nicotine and told other subjects that they would receive cigarettes that did 
not contain nicotine. Consequently what subjects received either matched or did not 
match this information. Next, Kelemen and Kaighobadi measured how subjects 
expected nicotine to affect their cognitive states, arousal, energy, and urge to smoke. 
Finally, to measure whether nicotine or expectancy resulted in a measurable behaviour 
change, all subjects took part in a prospective and free recall memory task. Subjects who 
received nicotine reported experiencing greater effects on the measures of taste, 
dizziness, irritability reduction and nausea. However, subjects who were told that they 
had received nicotine, regardless of whether they had or not, reported experiencing 
more wakefulness, concentration, hunger reduction and reduced urge to smoke. There 
was no effect of either nicotine or expecting to receive nicotine on the memory 
performance measures. In sum, while some subjective measures were directly affected 
by actual nicotine consumption, other behaviours were purely an artefact of subjects’ 
beliefs. Research on alcohol and alcohol placebos has produced similar findings.  
Alcohol. Myriad studies have shown that when people consume placebo alcohol 
they are likely to engage in socially taboo behaviours because, as previously discussed, it 
provides them with an excuse for explaining away their behaviours. Specifically placebo 
alcohol has led to decreased sexual inhibition (Lansky & Wilson, 1981; George & 
Marlatt, 1986; George, Stoner, Norris, Lopez & Lehman, 2000), increased risk taking 
(McMillan, Smith, & Wells-Parker, 1989), and increased aggression (Cherek, Steinberg & 
Manno, 1985; Lang, Goeckner, Adesso & Marlatt, 1975). For example, in one study 
George, Dermen and Nochajski (1989) found that subjects who were told that they had 
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consumed an alcoholic beverage were more likely to show interest in violent and erotic 
slides compared to the subjects who were told they had consumed a non-alcoholic 
beverage. Similarly, Lang et al. (1975) showed that when subjects believed that they had 
consumed alcohol, they were more likely to provide intense and painful electric shocks 
to an insulting confederate compared with the subjects who believed they had 
consumed a tonic beverage.  
In conclusion, research using the BPD has found robust expectancy effects in 
regard to people's social behaviours such as maintaining their smoking behaviour or 
reducing their social inhibition. Do placebos affect behaviours like attention and 
memory that are typically thought of as cognitive rather than social? The answer seems 
to be, it depends.  
Non-social behaviours  
Several attempts have been made to obtain placebo effects on people's cognitive 
behaviours, however, many of these attempts have proved unsuccessful. A review of 
these attempts follows. 
Attention. Clifasefi, Takarangi, and Bergman (2006) used the balanced placebo 
design to measure whether people who were told they had consumed alcohol were 
more at risk to inattentional blindness (IAB). The phenomenon of IAB occurs when 
people fail to perceive an object directly within their field of vision because their 
attention is diverted elsewhere (see Simons, 2000 for a review). In one particular IAB 
design, people watch a scene of a black shirted team and a white shirted team passing 
around two basketballs, and count the number of passes that either the black or white 
team make to each other. Halfway through the scene, a woman in a gorilla suit walks 
into the middle of the game, beats her chest and then walks out again. Simons and 
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Chabris (1999) found that across a series of experiments, approximately 50% of subjects 
failed to notice this highly distinctive and unusual event (Simons and Chabris, 1999).  
To address their research question Clifasefi et al. (2006) told half of their 
subjects that they were receiving a vodka drink, and half the subjects that they were 
receiving a tonic drink. What subjects received either matched or did not match this 
information. After receiving their drinks, subjects took part in the "gorilla" IAB 
experiment. Clifasefi et al. found that subjects who received alcohol, regardless of what 
they told, were twice as likely not notice the gorilla than subjects who did not receive 
alcohol. In other words, there was no placebo effect: alcohol expectancies did not affect 
whether or not people noticed the gorilla.  
Memory. Researchers have also studied how placebos affect memory. For 
example, a closer examination of Kelemen and Kaighobadi’s (2007) study of placebo 
effects on smoking showed expectancy effects for social behaviours such as hunger 
suppression, self-reported alertness and concentration. But there were no expectancy 
effects on the objective measures of memory performance. That is, while subjects 
reported that smoking improved their concentration and increased their alertness, these 
beliefs did not translate to actual improvement on the free recall and prospective 
memory task.  
Likewise, Kvavilashvili and Ellis (1999) gave subjects a sham “memory 
enhancing” or "memory impairing" drug before having them take free recall memory 
tests. Subjects who received the "enhancing" drug reported that their memories had 
improved while subjects who received the "impairing" drug reported that their 
memories were worse. But the drug expectancy affected only performance in the 
"impairment" condition: subjects who were led to expect that their memory would get 
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worse recalled fewer words and made more errors. Subjects who received the 
"enhancing" drug did not demonstrate any improvement on accuracy or quantity of 
information recalled on the word lists.  
Kvavilashvili and Ellis's findings fit with the literature suggesting that placebos 
do not affect cognitive behaviours if those behaviours are not within the capabilities of 
the person (Kirsch & Lynn, 1999). For example, a decrease in memory functioning by 
the "expect impairment" subjects could have been caused by a decrease in effort or 
motivation, whereas the "expect enhancement" group could only have demonstrated 
improvement if they had the ability to do so.  
In the only study to demonstrate actual improvement in recall memory, Van 
Oorsouw and Merkelbach (2007) examined whether a memory placebo could enhance 
or impair people’s memories for an emotional event. Subjects came to the laboratory for 
a sham drug study and watched a 3-minute segment of the evocative and violent film 
American History X. In the particular scene that subjects saw, a neo-Nazi shoots two 
black men who are attempting to steal his car. After watching the video clip subjects 
received a bogus drug, and were either told it was memory enhancing, memory 
impairing or a control substance. Thirty minutes later, everyone took a memory test. 
After excluding subjects who did not believe the manipulation, Van Oorsouw and 
Merkelbach found that subjects who expected the drug to improve their memories 
recalled more accurate information than subjects who expected the drug to impair, or 
do nothing, to their memories.  
While these results are interesting, they should be considered with some caution. 
Aspects of the methodology suggest that the "Told enhancement" subjects' better 
memory performance may have been caused by increased rehearsal. Although Van 
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Oorsouw and Merkelbach say that subjects were unaware that they would have their 
memories tested, the study was explicitly advertised as a study investigating the efficacy 
of memory drugs. Thus, it is likely that subjects would have been aware that their 
memories would be tested at some point. This knowledge might have alerted and 
motivated the “Told enhancement” subjects to try to remember the event well. If the 
authors had used a filler activity that stopped subjects from thinking about the event, 
the fact that subjects knew that they were taking part in a memory experiment should 
not have been a problem. But, the filler activity was not engaging or challenging: 
subjects filled out unrelated questionnaires and then read magazines. Consequently, it is 
possible that the “Told enhancement” subjects simply spent more time rehearsing the 
event than the “Told impairment” or control subjects.  
Why are placebo effects less readily demonstrated on cognitive behaviours? At 
least three reasons are proffered in the literature. First, placebos give people an excuse 
to engage in risky or taboo behaviour—behaviours typically viewed as negative—but 
there is little reason to think that people would desire the same effects for their 
cognitions (Hull & Bond, 1986; Kvavilashvili & Ellis, 1999; Marlatt & Rohsenow, 1980). 
Second, while people appear to have relatively strong views and expectations regarding 
how placebos affect their social behaviours, they don't typically hold strong views or 
expectations about how placebos affect very specific cognitive or motor abilities 
(Kvavilashvili and Ellis, 1999). For example, a study by Miller et al. (1978) examined 
how alcohol affected people’s memories for word lists and found no effect of placebo 
alcohol. The authors concluded "subjects are not likely to have had much drinking 
experience in situations in which free recall of lists of words is the relevant behaviour" 
(p. 48). On the other hand, people tend to have very strong beliefs and expectations 
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regarding how their social behaviours such as sexual arousal, aggression and confidence 
are affected by alcohol (Goldman et al. 1987). Third, for behaviour to be susceptible to 
a placebo, it must be within the capabilities of the person exercising it (Kirsch and 
Lynn, 1999). For example, if I take a sham pill that I expect will boost my general 
knowledge, it is unlikely that the pill would work because the amount of general 
knowledge I have in my head remains fixed and independent of the pill. Thus, while our 
social behaviours are within our control and can vary, many of our cognitive behaviours 
are not.  
In summary, research suggests that cognitive behaviours such as attention and 
free recall memory are outside the influence of placebo effects. However, another group 
of studies—namely those on memory distortion—show that to obtain placebo effects 
on memory, a paradigm should be used that comprises of both a cognitive and social 
component. One paradigm capturing both these components is the misinformation 
effect paradigm.  
 
The Misinformation Effect  
In the 1970s Loftus and colleagues showed subjects an event and then gave 
them false information about that event. On a later memory test, subjects performed 
more poorly when they had received false information compared to subjects who did 
not receive false information (Loftus, Miller & Burns, 1978). This finding has since been 
replicated in hundreds of studies and is referred to as the misinformation effect (Bonto & 
Payne, 1991; Loftus et al., 1978; Takarangi, Parker & Garry, 2006; Tousignant, Hall & 
Loftus, 1986; Sutherland & Hayne, 2001).  
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The classic method for studying the misinformation effect comprises three 
stages (see Figure 1.2). First subjects watch an event—such as a man shoplifting his way 
through a university bookstore. In the second stage subjects receive postevent 
information (PEI) about that event, typically in the form of a narrative. The PEI is 
designed so that half the time subjects receive generic information about the original 
event ("Jim picked up a candle") and half the time the information is deliberately 
misleading ("Jim picked up a yellow candle" when he actually picked up a white candle). 
Researchers distinguish between these two types of PEI as control and misled items. In the 
last phase, subjects take a memory test where they are asked to recall specific details 
from the original event, such as “what was the colour of the candle that Jim picked up?” 
In a typical test, subjects choose between the original event item (a white candle) and 
the misleading item (a yellow candle). Results consistently show that subjects who 
receive control PEI are better at remembering details from the original event compared 
to subjects who receive misled PEI. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2. An illustration of the three-stage misinformation method 
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A strength of the misinformation effect paradigm is that it allows researchers to 
examine both cognitive and social components of memory. On the one hand, control 
items measure subjects' memory for the original event; memory that is free from 
experimenter manipulation. One the other hand, misled items measure both memory 
for the original event, and the willingness of subjects to take on board suggestion from 
another person. A substantial body of literature demonstrates that in applying social 
manipulations—for example bringing into question the accuracy or credibility of the 
PEI—susceptibility to the misinformation effect rises and falls (Dodd & Bradshaw, 
1980; Echterhoff, Hirst & Hussy, 2005; Vornik, Sharman & Garry, 2003). Much 
research supports the hypothesis that source monitoring is the mechanism via which 
this susceptibility increases or decreases.  
 
The Source Monitoring Framework  
The Source Monitoring Framework (SMF) accounts for the processes 
underlying the attributions we make about our memories (Johnson, Hashtroudi & 
Lindsay, 1993). That is, how do we decide if we heard a piece of news from the TV or 
from our friend? How do we decide if an alien abducted us last night or if we simply 
dreamed that an alien abducted us?  
According to the SMF, memories are not stored with explicit tags of source-
specifying information attached to them that directly alert us to where, when and how 
we acquired a memory. Instead, we make decisions about the sources of our memories, 
based on the quality, type and strength of the qualitative characteristics encoded in 
memory during acquisition, and the judgement processes used at retrieval (see also 
Lindsay, 2008 for a recent review).  
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Qualitative characteristics  
According to the SMF, memories contain various characteristics about where, 
when and how the memory was formed. Examples of these characteristics are the 
perceptual, contextual, semantic, affective qualities of the memory, and the cognitive 
operations involved at the time of acquisition. Accordingly, memories differ in the type 
and amount of qualitative characteristics they contain depending on where and when 
they were acquired. For example, Suengas and Johnson (1988) examined whether 
memories from different sources contain different qualitative characteristics. Subjects 
either imagined or experienced events such as having a soda and some snacks or writing 
a letter of complaint. The next day, subjects rated their memories of the events on the 
Memory Characteristics Questionnaire (MCQ; Johnson, Foley, Suengas & Raye, 1988) 
rating the clarity, sensory detail, context, thoughts and feelings, and intensity associated 
with each memory. Suengas and Johnson found that subjects rated their memories of 
perceived events as being clearer, containing more sensory and contextual details, and 
containing more information about thoughts and feelings. In addition, subjects rated 
experienced events as more intense than memories for imagined events. These results 
support the claim of the SMF that memories from different sources differ in the type 
and amount of qualitative characteristics they contain.  
Yet, basing source decisions only on a memory's qualitative characteristics does 
not guarantee that we will correctly identify the source of that memory. For example, I 
may have a vivid and clear memory that last night I took a magic carpet ride around the 
city. My memory may feel clear and perceptually rich and I may have intense feelings 
and emotions surrounding it. Thus, if I were to base my attribution solely on these 
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characteristics, I would mistakenly conclude that because the memory feels real, I did 
indeed take the magic carpet ride and my memory originates from an actual experience.  
Alternatively, two competing memories may share similar and overlapping 
characteristics, thus making the likelihood of discriminating between those sources 
difficult. Henkel and Franklin (1998) either showed or had subjects imagine some 
everyday objects. On a later memory test, subjects discriminated between objects they 
had seen and those they had imagined. When seen and imagined objects were 
perceptually similar—for example a magnifying glass and a lollipop—subjects were 
more likely to confuse an imagined object with a seen object.  
Therefore, while using only the qualitative characteristics of a memory to make 
an attribution may lead to a correct source attribution, these same processes may also 
lead to source confusions and false memories. The second part of the SMF addresses 
how decision processes influence source attributions.  
Decision processes  
The SMF posits that decision processes help us determine whether qualitative 
characteristics provide sufficient evidence for attributing a memory to a particular 
source. The literature is in general agreement that usually, day-to-day decision processes 
occur rapidly and non-deliberatively with little conscious effort (Lindsay, 2008; Mitchell 
& Johnson, 2000). Typically, we engage in this type of automatic source monitoring 
when making decisions that have few serious consequences—for example, trying to 
decide which friend told us an amusing story. For an attribution based on rapid decision 
processes, the criteria may be based on whether or not the qualitative characteristics 
reach a certain level of familiarity or perceptual clarity: "if the familiarity of X is above Y 
then I will conclude that my memory comes from an actual experience.” 
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Less frequently, people use more careful and deliberate decision processes: they 
scrutinise memories more carefully and search for corresponding information that 
provides further evidence for attributing a memory to a particular source (Johnson et al., 
1993; Mitchell & Johnson, 2000). For example, I think that last night I took a magic 
carpet ride because the memory feels clear and vivid. Yet, when I compare this memory 
with my other beliefs and knowledge, for example I know that it is not plausible that 
carpets are magic and have the ability to fly, I am able to conclude that even though the 
qualitative characteristics of my memory make me feel like I took a magic carpet ride, 
my memory is false. We are likely to use these more deliberate decision processes when 
making important attributions: "did I really turn off the iron this morning or did I only 
think about turning the iron off?"  
To examine the decision processes that people use when making source 
attributions, Johnson et al. (1988) asked subjects how they determined if they had 
experienced or imagined certain events. Subjects rated the temporal, perceptual and 
emotional characteristics of experienced events more clearly and reported that they used 
supporting memories that were related to the target memory as further evidence. 
Subjects reported relying more on reasoning, general knowledge and plausibility when 
rating imagined events.  
Similarly, Dodson and Johnson (1993) examined the role that decision processes 
play in source monitoring. They showed subjects pictures and then showed them 
paragraphs of text. Some of the pictures and text were related; other pictures and text 
were unrelated. After subjects saw the pictures and text, they were divided into two 
groups and asked to identify the source of these materials. For one group, the source 
test had four possible choices: picture only, text only, both, or new. Another group took 
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a source test with only two choices: "Did you read this?" and then "if yes, was it a 
picture?" Subjects who took the four-choice source test made fewer source confusions 
than subjects who took the binary choice test. Dodson and Johnson reasoned that the 
four-choice source test required subjects to use more deliberate decision processes, 
examining all the possible sources of their memories, and scrutinising the characteristics 
of each source more carefully.  
Taken together, the literature suggests that if people use more deliberate and 
effortful decision processes, they are less susceptible to source errors and confusions. 
Still, effortful decision processes do not guarantee a correct source attribution. The final 
attribution that people make is generally based on a combination of qualitative 
characteristics and judgement processes, but is affected by both social and cognitive 
factors.  
Attribution  
The final step in making a source attribution is heavily dependent on the quality 
of the encoding experience: if encoding conditions are poor—such as high stress or 
divided attention—then source characteristics will also be poor (Mitchell & Johnson, 
2000; Troyer, Winocur, Craik & Moscovitch, 1999; Zaragoza & Lane, 1998). Zaragoza 
and Lane (1998; Exp. 1) examined the effects of divided attention on subjects’ 
susceptibility to misinformation. First, all subjects watched an event. During the PEI 
phase, some subjects received PEI under full attention while others received PEI under 
divided attention, performing a secondary music identification task at the same time. 
Compared to the subjects who acquired the memory under full attention, the divided 
attention subjects made more source confusions. These results suggest that the increase 
in source confusions was due to the divided attention: subjects encoded fewer source-
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specifying characteristics that they could later use to help identify and discriminate 
between items’ sources.  
People also make source attributions on the basis of their expectations, biases 
and beliefs. Bayen, Nakamura, Dupuis and Yang (2000) showed subjects objects and 
scenes that were consistent with their expectations (e.g. a towel in a bathroom), or 
objects that were inconsistent with their expectations (e.g. a nightstand in a bathroom). 
On a later source test, subjects were more likely to attribute the source to an item that 
was consistent with their expectations regardless of where the object actually came 
from. For example, a subject who saw a scene of a nightstand in a bathroom was more 
likely on the source test to incorrectly attribute seeing the nightstand in the bedroom. 
Similarly, Marsh, Cook and Hicks (2006) found that subjects were more likely to make 
source attributions that fitted with their gender-stereotypical beliefs. Specifically, 
subjects were more likely to attribute a statement as coming from a male speaker if it 
reflected stereotypical male beliefs and were more likely to misattribute a statement as 
coming from a female speaker if it reflected stereotypical female beliefs.  
Thus, Mitchell and Johnson (2000) posit: “as imperfect judgement processes are 
applied to mental representations that are themselves imperfect some errors are bound 
to occur” (pp. 181). Consequently, source monitoring plays a fundamental role in 
people's susceptibility to false memories and in particular the misinformation effect.  
Source Monitoring and the Misinformation Effect  
The misinformation effect reflects people’s ability to correctly monitor the 
sources of their memories. When subjects answer on the memory test with the 
misleading PEI, their memory distortions are a direct reflection a source confusion.  
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According to Johnson and colleagues, the design on a typical misinformation 
effect experiment increases subjects' likelihood of making source confusions for two 
reasons (Johnson et al., 1993; Mitchell & Johnson, 2000). First, as previously discussed, 
when two memories share similar qualitative characteristics, source confusions increase 
(Henkel et al., 1998; Lindsay et al., 1990). In a misinformation effect experiment, the 
two competing sources of information, the event item and PEI item, may share many of 
the same characteristics (Mitchell & Johnson, 2000). For example, the conditions under 
which people encode the event and PEI items are the same: people receive them in the 
same room, in the presence the same experimenter, and generally in the same 
experimental session. Additionally, the event and PEI narrative are essentially identical 
except from the critical details. Thus, there is high overlap between the contextual 
similarity of the information surrounding the event and PEI details, meaning that 
subjects may have trouble distinguishing which item came from which source (Mitchell 
& Johnson, 2000).  
Second, the format of the standard memory test increases the likelihood that 
subjects will make source confusions (Johnson et al., 1993; Mitchell & Johnson, 2000). 
The critical items on the test are embedded among a number of relatively easy filler 
items that induce subjects to respond on the basis of familiarity. That is, the filler items 
require subjects to choose between an item actually encountered in the event (a familiar 
item) and an entirely new item (an unfamiliar item.) Because the filler items make up the 
majority of the test, the test encourages subjects to habitually respond on the basis of 
familiarity. If subjects start to respond habitually, they may stop attending to potentially 
important qualitative cues of the critical items and thus their susceptibility to 
misinformation increases. Yet, despite the fact that the typical format of misinformation 
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effect experiments maximises subjects' susceptibility to misinformation, research shows 
that increasing or decreasing their source monitoring behaviours—either directly or 
indirectly—changes susceptibility to the misinformation effect.  
Giving subjects source monitoring tests directly increases their source 
monitoring behaviours (Lindsay & Johnson, 1989; Zaragoza & Koshmider, 1989; 
Zaragoza & Lane, 1994). Whereas forced choice recognition tests lead subjects to 
respond quickly and automatically on the basis of familiarity, source monitoring tests 
require subjects to slow down and examine all possible sources of their memory for 
each test item. For example, source monitoring tests typically ask subjects whether an 
item came from the event, the PEI, both, or neither. By asking this question subjects 
must examine their memories for characteristics of each possible source: someone who 
sees Jim steal a math book in the event but is told he steals a chemistry book during the 
narrative may think back to event and remember the book seemed bright, colourful and 
the label was white; in contrast they may think back to the narrative and think that the 
other details surrounding the book are incomplete or weak. Thus, they may accurately 
conclude that they saw the math book only in the event.  
Lindsay and Johnson (1989) directly compared subjects’ susceptibility to 
misinformation on recognition test and source monitoring tests. All subjects took part 
in a standard misinformation effect experiment. At test, subjects either took a standard 
forced choice yes/no recognition test or a source monitoring test. Over two 
experiments, subjects who took the source monitoring test were less misled than 
subjects who took the yes/no recognition test. That is, administering a source 
monitoring test decreased subjects’ susceptibility to the misinformation effect. Other 
studies have found similar results (see Zaragoza & Koshmider, 1989 and Zaragoza and 
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Lane, 1994). Taken together, this group of studies shows that people’s source 
monitoring can be directly manipulated with source monitoring tests and that these 
behaviours are ultimately reflected as more or less susceptibility to memory distortion. 
Other studies however, show that social manipulations—bringing into question the 
reliability of the PEI—also affect people’s source monitoring behaviours.  
When subjects receive misleading information about the event, they must at 
some stage capitulate to the misinformation. If subjects do not capitulate, they are likely 
to use better source monitoring—increased scrutiny of the PEI or increased effort at 
test—which is reflected in less memory distortion. One critical factor that affects 
whether or not capitulation occurs is the perceived social status or agenda of the 
"misinformation messenger." Studies manipulating the credibility of the 
misinformation’s source show that if subjects judge the messenger to be untrustworthy, 
unreliable or even a little stupid, they are more likely to resist the misleading information 
(Dodd & Bradshaw, 1980; Echterhoff et al., 2005; Vornik et al., 2003). For example, 
Dodd and Bradshaw (1980) showed subjects a slide sequence of a traffic accident and 
then told subjects that the PEI was either written by a person who was involved in the 
car accident, or by an innocent bystander. Dodd and Bradshaw reasoned that subjects 
would perceive a person involved in the accident as having reason to lie about the 
details of the event; someone who simply observed the accident—an "innocent 
bystander"—would have no reason to lie. The results reflected this assumption: subjects 
were more likely to capitulate to misinformation if an innocent bystander provided it; 
subjects were more likely to reject the misinformation if someone perceived as 
untrustworthy provided it. Both groups, however, performed similarly on control items. 
Based on Dodd and Bradshaw's reasoning, it is likely that subjects who were "warned" 
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about the driver involved in the accident increased their source monitoring by paying 
more attention to the details in the narrative, thus increasing their ability to detect 
differences between the event and PEI. Subjects may also have increased their decision 
processes on the test by thinking carefully about their answers and not responding 
solely on the basis of familiarity (Johnson et al., 1993).  
Similarly, Echterhoff et al., (2005) examined whether subjects’ source 
monitoring behaviours would be affected by a social manipulation administered 
immediately before the memory test. Over four experiments, Echterhoff et al. 
manipulated the credibility of the misinformation messenger by bringing into question 
their credibility, trustworthiness or ability. Other subjects did not receive this social 
information, but were explicitly asked to monitor the source of their memories more 
carefully at test. Another group of subjects received no warning. Echterhoff et al. found 
that all subjects performed equally well on control items. But, both socially warned and 
source monitoring warned subjects were less misled than unwarned subjects. In 
addition, subjects who received the social or source monitoring warning were slower to 
respond on test. Echterhoff et al. reasoned that since their warnings were administered 
after the PEI, subjects were not less misled due to increased scrutiny of the PEI. 
Therefore, Echterhoff et al. reasoned that their post-PEI warnings induced subjects to 
use more deliberate and effortful decision processes during the test and their increased 
effort was reflected as increased response time.  
Other studies have also demonstrated similar effects with the misinformation 
effect rising and falling depending on the relationship the subject has with the 
misinformation messenger (French, Garry & Mori, 2008), or the perceived 
attractiveness and power of the person delivering the PEI (Vornik et al., 2003). Thus, 
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there is ample evidence to suggest that subjects’ source monitoring behaviours in a 
misinformation effect experiment are affected by social manipulations.  
The Placebo Effect and Susceptibility to Misinformation 
With research showing that the misinformation effect comprises both social and 
cognitive factors, and research showing that the placebos can affect people’s social 
behaviours but not cognitive behaviours, Assefi and Garry (2003) hypothesised that the 
misinformation effect paradigm is an ideal method to study how placebos might affect 
memory. Specifically, they reasoned that telling subjects they had consumed alcohol 
might lead them to distrust their memories for the event and place more weight in the 
PEI. As a consequence, source monitoring behaviours may be reduced as subjects 
would be less likely to question or scrutinise the external suggestions provided by a 
misinformation narrative. If this occurs, subjects who receive misleading PEI may go 
through a deliberation process that results in a conclusion such as "I'm drunk, therefore 
I will trust what you're saying here as you know best". On the other hand, Assefi and 
Garry reasoned that placebo alcohol is not real alcohol. Thus, memory for control 
items—items that are a measure of the cognitive component of memory—should 
remain unaffected.  
Assefi and Garry used half the balanced placebo design: half the participants 
were told that they were receiving a vodka drink mixed with tonic (Told Alcohol) and 
the other half were told that they were receiving a plain tonic drink (Told Tonic). In 
reality, none of the subjects received any alcohol, as the vodka was nothing more than 
flat tonic. To enhance the likelihood that subjects would believe the manipulation, they 
drank from glasses that had been rubbed with vodka soaked limes, the drinks were 
prepared in full view of the subjects, and vodka was poured from Absolut Vodka 
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bottles that appeared to have unbroken seals. After consuming their drinks subjects 
took part in a standard misinformation effect experiment.  
Assefi and Garry found two key findings. First, all subjects performed equally 
well on control items: both told tonic and told alcohol subjects were accurate for the 
items that they were not misled about. Second, a placebo effect was obtained on misled 
items for the Told Alcohol subjects. That is, subjects who were told that their drinks 
contained vodka, were more likely to capitulate to misleading information than their 
Told Tonic counterparts. The results of Assefi and Garry suggest that while a placebo 
can affect subjects’ susceptibility to misinformation, true memory for the original event 
remains intact. Taken together, their findings converge with the literature on the 
placebo effect and social behaviours. First, an alcohol placebo did not affect the 
cognitive aspect of the misinformation effect: memory for control performance was 
equivalent in both groups. An alcohol placebo however, did affect the social component 
of memory—specifically subjects’ susceptibility to misinformation.  
Since a placebo increases susceptibility to misinformation by reducing effortful 
source monitoring, Clifasefi et al. (2007) reasoned that a placebo might also be able to 
decrease susceptibility to misinformation, if it increases effortful source monitoring. To 
test their hypothesis, they brought subjects to the laboratory under the guise of taking 
part in a drug trial testing the efficacy of a new cognitive enhancing drug—R273—on 
visual and verbal modes of learning. In reality, however, R273 was nothing more than 
lime-flavoured baking soda. Pains were taken to ensure that subjects believed the drug 
manipulation: a confederate in a white lab coat and posing as a pharmaceutical 
researcher from a fictitious drug company was present for the entirety of the session 
and subjects were informed that R273 had been tested on military radar operating 
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personnel and made them “better able to detect changes in their visual fields, and 
quickly and accurately distinguish enemy target signatures from simple environmental 
noise” (p. 114). In addition, subjects were weighed and measured and saw the drugs 
being prepared in full view. Clifasefi et al. told some subjects that they would receive 
R273 (Told Drug) and told some subjects that they would receive the inactive version 
(Told Inactive). After the drug administration phase, everyone took part in a 
misinformation effect experiment. In the final phase of the experiment, subjects were 
asked to rate the degree to which R273 had affected them on a range of specific 
physiological and cognitive measures.  
Clifasefi et al. found three key results. First, Told Drug subjects rated 
themselves as experiencing more of R273’s effects such as enhanced senses, better 
concentration, better memory, and quicker responses. Second, while the Told Inactive 
subjects demonstrated a classic misinformation effect, Told Drug subjects did not: 
subjects who were told that they had taken a cognitive enhancing drug were resistant to 
the effects of misleading information. Third, subjects performed no differently on 
control items: regardless of what subjects were told about their drug, neither of the 
groups had a better overall memory for the event. The finding that all subjects 
performed equally well on control items led Clifasefi et al. to conclude that their R273 
effect was not simply a by-product of the Told Drug subjects paying more attention to 
the event, or rehearsing the event more than their Told Inactive counterparts. 
Therefore, Clifasefi et al. speculated that R273 reduced Told Drug subjects’ 
susceptibility to misinformation because it increased their source monitoring.  
Taken together, the studies of Assefi and Garry (2003) and Clifasefi et al. (2007) 
highlight some important findings. First, the placebo effect can be reflected in some 
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aspects of memory but not others. That is, cognitive aspects of memory are unaffected 
by placebo manipulations aimed at either decreasing memory (alcohol) or increasing 
memory (R273). Social aspects of memory however, are affected by placebo 
manipulations. Assefi and Garry demonstrated that a placebo could increase 
susceptibility to misinformation and Clifasefi et al. demonstrated that a placebo could 
decrease susceptibility to misinformation. Yet although the emerging literature suggests 
that placebos affect social—but not cognitive—components of memory by changing 
source monitoring, researchers still do not know how, or when, those source 
monitoring changes occur.  
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Thesis Overview 
 
The overarching goal of this thesis was to extend the body of literature on 
placebo effects and memory by examining if a memory placebo called R273 decreased 
people’s resistance to the misinformation effect because it increased their source 
monitoring. A second goal was to establish whether other memory tasks, which are 
affected by effortful monitoring, would also succumb to the R273 placebo effect.  
Experiment 1 aimed to find empirical support for the hypothesis that R273 
reduces the misinformation effect because subjects switch from their usually automatic 
and easy source monitoring to more deliberate and effortful source monitoring. If R273 
produces response expectancies that lead Told Drug subjects to shift to more effortful 
source monitoring during the PEI or test, I might find that they take longer than Told 
Inactive subjects to answer misled test items. Experiment 1 also aimed to establish 
whether certain subjects—namely, those with higher working memory capacity 
(WMC)—might respond differently to R273. 
The aim of Experiment 2 was to to align the method more closely with the 
literature on postwarnings and the misinformation effect, and find evidence that 
converged with the results of Experiment 1. Specifically, I examined whether the R273 
placebo effect occurs because of subjects’ source monitoring during the memory test. 
To do so, all subjects were told that they would receive the inactive version of R273, 
and were then run through a misinformation effect experiment. Immediately before the 
memory test however, I falsely told some subjects that they had actually received the 
active version of R273. If R273 “works” primarily because it changes source monitoring 
during the memory test, Told Drug subjects should be less misled than their Told 
Inactive counterparts.  
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Finally, Experiment 3 examined whether the underlying monitoring processes 
that people use to perform prospective memory tasks were similar to the source 
monitoring processes that they use for retrospective memory tasks. To address this 
question, the R273 drug administration procedure was combined with a prospective 
memory task. If R273 increased monitoring, Told Drug subjects should be better able 
than Told Inactive subjects to remember to perform certain types of prospective 
memory tasks. However, if Told Drug subjects have better prospective memories 
because of monitoring, they should be slower or less accurate at performing a 
concurrent and ongoing task. 
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Chapter 2 
Experiment 1: A psychotropic placebo decreases the misinformation 
effect by increasing monitoring at test 
My aims in Experiment 1 were three-fold. First, I aimed to replicate Clifasefi et 
al.’s (2007) finding that a sham cognitive enhancing drug could reduce subjects’ 
susceptibility to the misinformation effect.  Second, I aimed to find empirical support 
for the hypothesis that R273 reduces the misinformation effect because subjects switch 
from their usually automatic and easy source monitoring to more deliberate and 
effortful source monitoring. Third, I aimed to establish whether certain subjects—
namely, those with higher working memory capacity—might respond differently to 
R273.  
Identifying the Mechanism of R273 
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the SMF suggests that people’s decision processes 
help them determine whether the qualitative characteristics of a memory provide 
sufficient evidence for attributing that memory to a particular source. Typically, these 
decision processes occur rapidly and non-deliberatively with little conscious effort, and 
in a misinformation experiment increase subjects’ susceptibility to the effects of 
misleading information (Johnson et al., 1993; Lindsay, 2008; Mitchell & Johnson, 2000). 
Less frequently, however, people use more careful and deliberate decision processes: 
they scrutinise memories more carefully; search for corresponding information and 
evidence, and may require a higher threshold or criteria on any of the qualitative 
characteristics before attributing a memory to a source. Literature suggests that in a 
misinformation effect experiment, when subjects use more effortful and deliberate 
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source monitoring, they are less susceptible to the effects of misleading suggestion 
(Echterhoff et al., 2005; Lindsay & Johnson, 1989). Thus, the misinformation effect 
literature suggests two ways by which R273 may increase subjects’ source monitoring 
and consequently decrease their susceptibility to the misinformation effect.  
The first point at which R273 might lead subjects to use more effortful and 
deliberate source monitoring is during the PEI—research suggests that subjects who 
pay greater attention to the PEI are less misled on the later memory test (Greene et al., 
1982; Tousignant et al., 1986). In one study, Greene et al. (1982) warned subjects either 
before the event, PEI or memory test that some of the PEI was incorrect. They found 
that while warning subjects before the event and the memory test did nothing to reduce 
their susceptibility to misleading information, warning subjects immediately before the 
PEI decreased their susceptibility to misleading information. In addition, warned 
subjects read the PEI more slowly than their un-warned counterparts. Convergent 
evidence from Tousignant et al. (1986) also showed that subjects who read the PEI 
more slowly—either of their own accord or because they were told to—were less 
misled.  Tousignant et al. reasoned that when subjects scrutinise the PEI more carefully, 
they are more likely to notice the discrepancy between what they saw and what they 
read. Tousignant et al. called the likelihood of noticing the differences the principle of 
discrepancy detection. I hypothesised that R273 might produce response expectancies that 
lead subjects to increase their discrepancy detection during the PEI. Specifically, Told 
Drug subjects might read and scrutinise the misleading passages more slowly and 
carefully than Told Inactive subjects.  
The second point at which R273 might lead subjects to use more effortful and 
deliberate source monitoring is during the memory test. Recall from Chapter 1, the 
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format of a typical 2-alternative forced-choice (2AFC) recognition test encourages 
subjects to take the test by relying on easy and effortless source monitoring, answering 
misled items quickly but inaccurately, and increasing the likelihood of source confusions 
(Johnson et al., 1993; Lindsay & Johnson, 1989; Mitchell & Johnson, 2000). On the 
other hand, research tells us that when subjects use more deliberate and effortful source 
monitoring during the memory test, their susceptibility to misleading information 
decreases. Potentially, when subjects use more slow and effortful source monitoring on 
the memory test, they override their tendency to judge accuracy on the basis of 
familiarity and pay more attention to a greater variety of qualitative characteristics. For 
example, a host of studies suggest that directly alerting subjects to the erroneous nature 
of the PEI immediately before the memory test leads them to increase their source 
monitoring and be less misled (Chambers & Zaragoza, 2001; Christiaansen & Ochalek, 
1983; Echterhoff et al., 2005; Frost, Ingraham & Wilson, 2002; Meade & Roediger, 
2002). In addition, subjects who are slow to respond to test items (using more effortful 
source monitoring) tend to be more accurate; subjects who are fast to respond to test 
items (using quick and automatic source monitoring) tend to be more inaccurate 
(Echterhoff et al., 2005; Loftus et al., 1989). Echterhoff et al. (2005), for example, ran 
subjects through a standard misinformation effect experiment but gave some subjects a 
warning about the quality of the PEI immediately before they took the memory test. 
Specifically, Echterhoff et al. told some subjects that the PEI was prepared by someone 
who was not credible and likely to lie, or by someone who was of questionable 
intelligence. Echterhoff et al. found two key results: first, warned subjects were less 
misled, and second, warned subjects were slower to respond to misleading test 
questions. Taken together, Echterhoff et al.’s accuracy and response time findings lend 
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support to the idea that warning subjects about the PEI leads them to switch from easy, 
heuristic source monitoring to effortful and deliberate source monitoring. If R273 
produces response expectancies that lead Told Drug subjects to shift to more effortful 
source monitoring at test, Told Drug subjects might take longer than Told Inactive 
subjects to answer misled test items. 
 
Working memory capacity 
My third aim in Experiment 1 was to address whether the effectiveness of R273 
is related to subjects’ WMC. A growing body of research suggests that WMC is central 
to people’s ability to control attention and affects their ability to perform myriad of 
higher-order cognitive tasks such as dichotic listening tasks, anti-saccade tasks, reading 
comprehension, language comprehension, and reasoning (Conway, Cowan & Bunting, 
2001; Daneman & Carpenter; 1980; Kane, Bleckley, Conway & Engle, 2001; Kane, 
Hambrick & Conway, 2005). Put simply, WMC encompasses people’s ability to keep 
important information active, while blocking out interference—skills that are the 
essence of successful source monitoring (Conway et al., 2001; Engle, 2002; Engle & 
Kane, 2004; Hester & Garavan, 2005; Kane, et al., 2001; Kane & Engle, 2000; 2003). As 
such, WMC has been linked with people’s susceptibility to certain types of false 
memories (Jaschinski & Wentura, 2002; Watson, Bunting, Poole & Conway, 2005).  
In one study, Jaschinski and Wentura (2002) measured subjects’ WMC using the 
Operation Span Task (OSPAN; Turner & Engle, 1989) and then ran them through a 
misinformation effect experiment. In an OSPAN task, subjects solve mathematical 
equations while trying to remember strings of random letter sequences or words. For 
example, subjects might see the sequence Q, A, V, B, S, X, L and are then asked to 
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solve the equation (2 x 7 – 4 = 8: true or false). Subjects’ goal on an OSPAN task is to 
correctly remember the letter strings whilst keeping their math accuracy high. The more 
letters correctly recalled, the higher the OSPAN. Consequently, higher OSPAN scores 
indicate a higher WMC—people known as high spans; lower OSPAN scores indicate a 
lower WMC—people known as low spans. Jaschinski and Wentura found that their 
results converged with the idea that higher spans are better able to focus their attention 
and block out interfering information; OSPAN score was negatively correlated with 
subjects’ susceptibility to the misinformation effect. In other words, the lower subjects’ 
WMC, the more likely they were to be misled.  
Other false memory effects that are closely tied to source monitoring—namely 
the Deese (1959), Roediger and McDermott (1995; DRM) illusion—suggest that in 
certain situations, higher spans may be more “cognitively equipped” to resist false 
memories. In a DRM task, people are shown a list of thematically related words (e.g. bed, 
rest, awake, pillow, dream, snooze, snore, drowsy) that are all highly associated with a particular 
non-presented target word (e.g. sleep). On a later recognition memory test subjects are 
presented with words from the original list (old words; e.g. pillow); words that are new 
and unrelated to the original list (new words; e.g. mountain); and the previously non-
presented, yet highly associated target word (critical lure; e.g. sleep). The typical and robust 
finding is that subjects are very good at identifying words that are old and rejecting 
words that are new. Often, however, subjects misattribute the critical lure as being from 
the original list (Roediger & McDermott, 1995; 1998; Smeets, Jelicic & Merkelbach, 
2006).  
In a typical DRM experiment, WMC differences do not occur. That is, higher 
spans are no better at resisting the critical lure at test than their lower span counterparts. 
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Similar to the familiarity driven processes that lead people to be misled in a 
misinformation effect experiment, DRM subjects are thought to rely on a relatively 
automatic process to determine if they encountered the lure word in the word list. 
Because an automatic mechanism does not demand controlled attention, it makes sense 
that WMC differences do not emerge. Yet research shows that high spans are better 
able to control their attention and reduce their DRM errors accordingly, if they are 
alerted to override their reliance on familiarity. For example, Watson et al. (2005) ran all 
subjects through a typical DRM paradigm but warned some subjects about the false lure 
that would be presented during the memory test. Thus, unwarned subjects were simply 
asked to remember the related words from the list; warned subjects were asked to 
remember words from the list as well as trying to identify—and then ward off—the 
distracting influence of the critical lure. Watson et al. found that warned subjects with a 
higher WMC were better able to heed the warning about the DRM effect and resist false 
memories at test. Without the warning, WMC did not matter. These results suggest that 
higher spans could capitalise on a warning in a way that lower spans could not, using 
their superior cognitive control to block the automatic tendency to otherwise report the 
lure word.  
I hypothesised that R273 might cause a pattern of results similar to those 
obtained by Watson et al. (2005). Specifically, subjects might act in line with R273’s 
response expectancies, adopting a deliberate source monitoring strategy similar to one 
produced by a warning about the DRM. If so, higher spans who are told they are 
receiving the drug should be better able to identify discrepancies between what they saw 
and what they read, and use their cognitive control to block their tendency to otherwise 
report the suggested detail during the test. I hypothesised that I would find a 
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relationship between WMC and resistance to misleading suggestion among Told Drug 
subjects, but not Told Inactive subjects, for whom R273 should not produce response 
expectancies. 
Method 
Subjects  
Ninety-six introductory psychology students took part for course credit. They 
were run in groups of three or less, and did not interact with one another during the 
session. 
Design 
I used a 2 x 2 mixed design with drug instruction (Told Drug or Told Inactive) 
as the between-subjects factor, and PEI (control or misled) as the within-subjects factor. 
To control for potential time of day effects (Hasher, Goldstein, & May, 2005) I ran two 
experimental sessions in the morning and two in the afternoon.  
Materials and Procedure 
The procedure was based on Clifasefi et al.’s (2007) method with some minor 
modifications. There were five phases to the experiment; the key phases are summarised 
in Figure 2.1. 
Phase 1:OSPAN. In a departmental mass testing session, I obtained scores from 
759 first year psychology students on the automated Operation Span task (OSPAN; 
Unsworth et al., 2005). The OSPAN task consisted of 75 trials in which people solved 
mathematical equations while attempting to remember a sequence of random letters. 
This sequence continued until the end of each trial, at which point people had to choose 
which letters had been presented from a grid of 12 letters. There were three to seven 
letters per trial. To control for the possibility that subjects would concentrate only on 
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remembering the letters and not solve the math equations, math accuracy had to remain 
above 85%; the computer issued a warning if accuracy dropped below this point.  
For each subject, I calculated an OSPAN score as the total number of letters 
correctly recalled on successfully completed trials. After excluding 66 subjects because 
they did not complete all 75 trials or because their overall math accuracy fell below 85%, 
I was left with scores from 693 subjects. These scores ranged from 0 to 75, with a 
median of 40 (M = 38.92, SD = 18.40) and were comparable to those reported in other 
published studies (see Unsworth et al., 2005). 
A week later, I advertised a new and ostensibly unrelated experiment restricted 
to those who had taken part in the mass testing session. This experiment was advertised 
as a clinical trial testing the efficacy of a new cognitive enhancing drug, R273, on visual 
and verbal modes of learning.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1. Overview of the procedure used in Experiment 1 
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Phase 2: Cultivating response expectancies. In the second phase, I worked to cultivate 
response expectancies about R273. To that end, a small laboratory on campus was set 
up (see Figure 3.1) that was seemingly run as a joint partnership between a fictitious 
drug company, Jinal Placard, and the School of Psychology. The laboratory was 
designed to have a high security, corporate ambience: a fake swipe card access machine 
was fitted to the door; a dummy security camera was installed; and I created high quality 
promotional Jinal Placard posters with a corporate logo (see Figure 2.2). I block-
mounted the posters and hung them on the walls of the laboratory in full view of the 
subjects. I told people that I was a PhD student working in collaboration with the 
pharmaceutical company and, to further enhance my credibility, appeared in the 
laboratory toting a Jinal Placard mug, used a desk littered with Jinal Placard pens, and 
sat near a Jinal Placard first aid kit.  
When subjects came into the laboratory, they were seated in individual 
compartments so they could not see or communicate with each other, and received 
information and consent forms. To enhance the authenticity of the trials, the sheet 
informed subjects that they must withdraw from the trial if they took any blood 
thinning medication, frequently experienced migraines, had liver dysfunction, there was 
a chance they may be pregnant, or if they had a sensitivity to Vitamin C.  
Next subjects watched a fictitious promotional movie about R273, purportedly 
produced by its (also fictitious) pharmaceutical company. In reality, I created the movie 
using Final Cut Pro 3 and iDVD 4 software from Apple, Inc.
©
 The movie lasted for 
approximately 6 minutes and informed people that previous trials had shown R273 to 
be safe and effective in increasing mental alertness and cognitive functioning. The 
movie also informed people that a “close cousin” of R273 had been tested on US 
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military radar operators and had significantly increased their ability to detect and 
distinguish changes in their visual fields. A scientist explained the mechanism of action. 
At no stage did the movie or scientist mention the word “memory” or a related concept. 
After the movie finished, to further increase response expectancies, subjects were 
warned that R273 produced some mild physiological side effects, such as an increase in 
heart rate, a slight head rush and mild tingling in the fingertips.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2 (A) Photographs of the equipment displayed on the experimenter’s desk that included: 
the drug bottles, the Jinal Placard mug and pens, and the electronic scales for measuring out the 
powder; (B) the bottles that were on display to subjects throughout the experiment; (C) a 
photograph of the laboratory showing where subjects were seated.
A 
B 
C 
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Figure 2.3. Photographs of block-mounted posters that were displayed on the walls of the Jinal 
Placard laboratory. 
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Phase 3: Drug administration. After the response expectancy phase, the drug 
administration phase began. each subject’s weight and sex was recorded and subjects 
were told that this information would be used to determine the exact amount of 
substance each would receive. Next, I recorded weight data into a computer and waited 
while the computer software “randomly assigned them to their drug condition.” These 
steps were also completely bogus. I told subjects whether they were to receive the active 
drug or inactive compound, and then they watched as a weighted dose of R273 or 
inactive compound was transferred from clearly labelled bottles onto a scientific 
balance. The substance was mixed with 20mls of water and then distributed to each 
subject who drank his or her portion. Subjects were informed that R273 needed several 
minutes to take effect, and in the meantime, watched a 10-minute action clip from the 
movie Harry Potter and the Sorcerer’s Stone that was actually used to stop subjects from 
introspecting about their physiological and psychological state.  
Phase 4: Misinformation effect. When the action clip ended, the misinformation 
effect phase began. So that I was consistent with Clifasefi et al.’s (2007) procedure I 
used the misinformation stimuli from their study1.  
Subjects watched one of two versions of a slide series depicting a man 
shoplifting various items from a bookstore (see Loftus, 1991). There were 62 slides; 
each slide appeared for 2.5 seconds, and the entire event lasted 2 minutes and 57 
seconds. Eight of the slides contained a critical item—an item that would later be 
described with generic or misleading information in the misleading postevent summary. 
I display the slides in Table 2.1.  
                                                 
1 Examples of the materials used in this experiment appear in the Appendices 
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Table 2.1 Eight critical differences between the misinformation event (Loftus, 1991) 
Critical Detail Slide Version 1 Slide Version 2 
 
 
Candle 
 
 
Yellow Candle 
 
 
 
 
 
White Candle 
 
 
Notebook 
 
 
Green 
 
 
Yellow 
 
 
Stapler 
 
 
Red 
 
 
Blue 
 
 
Text book 
 
 
Chemistry  
 
 
Computer 
 
 
Sweatshirt 
 
 
Mickey Mouse 
 
 
Minnie Mouse 
 
 
Magazine 
 
 
GQ 
 
 
Vogue 
 
 
Lift Door 
 
 
Open  
 
 
Closed  
 
 
Towel 
 
 
Light blue towel 
 
 
White towel 
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After a 12-minute filler task, subjects read the misleading summary. There were 
four versions, each counterbalanced so that every critical item from the slides appeared 
equally often as a control and misled item. Every combination of drug and PEI 
summary also appeared equally often across the four time-of-day sessions. 
I divided the 541-word summary into 16 passages, each with a mean of 33.69 
words (SD = 9.53, Range = 14-54) and used Superlab 4.0 to present them on a 14-inch 
iBook, which each subject used throughout the session. Eight of these passages referred 
to a critical event item, and contained a mean of 34.88 words (SD = 9.33 Range = 14-
41). Four of the eight passages were control items, those described only generically, while 
the remaining four were misled items, those described inaccurately. Subjects read the 
passages at their own pace and pressed the space bar to move from one passage to the 
next. While they did so, I covertly measured reading speed. 
Phase 5: Memory Test. After a 3-minute distracter task, I tested subjects’ memories 
for the original event. Using the iBooks, everyone took a 20-item, 2AFC memory test. 
Eight of the questions referred to the critical items from the slide sequence; the four 
questions about misled items forced subjects to choose between the item that appeared 
in the event and an item that was only suggested in the summary. The remaining 
questions were fillers. For every question, subjects also rated their confidence on a scale 
of 1 (not at all confident) to 5 (very confident). Once again I covertly recorded response times 
for each question.  
Finally, subjects completed a short questionnaire that was used as a 
manipulation check. On a 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much so) scale, they rated the degree to 
which they had experienced specific cognitive effects associated with R273. Examples 
of the questions used are “My senses were enhanced,” “I had an easier time 
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remembering things,” “My responses were quicker than normal,” and “I was able to 
concentrate more easily.” A space at the end of the questionnaire also provided subjects 
with the option of elaborating on how they felt throughout the session. 
Results and Discussion 
Manipulation Check 
Before turning to my primary analyses, I determined whether Told Drug 
subjects reported that they had observed cognitive effects in line with some of R273’s 
response expectancies. In other words, did the drug manipulation work? To answer this 
question, I classified the six cognitive effects measures according to whether subjects 
were told they had received the active or inactive version of the drug, and display these 
means in Figure 2.4.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4 Mean score for the manipulation check by drug instruction. 
 
As Figure 2.4 shows, subjects believed the manipulation: Told Drug subjects 
reported better cognitive abilities than Told Inactive subjects, F (1,93) = 79.15, p <. 01, 
ηp2= .80. However, Told Drug subjects did not report uniformly better cognitive 
abilities, as the interaction between drug instruction and cognitive ability ratings shows, 
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F (5, 89) = 5.38; p < .01, ηp2= .23. Follow-up pairwise comparisons revealed that 
although there was a trend for Told Drug subjects to rate themselves as higher on the 
cognitive effect of attention, t (94) = 1.69, p = .09, this trend did not reach significance. 
Told Drug subjects rated all other cognitive abilities significantly higher than their Told 
Inactive counterparts (all p < .01).  
Subjects’ comments also fit with these empirical findings. For example, subject 
19 wrote “I’m very aware of things happening, it is like everything around me looks 
sharper like I could focus perfectly at something. When I came in I was exhausted but I 
feel alert now.” Similarly, subject 43 reported “felt more alert and awake than I did 
when I first came into the room,” while subject 57 reported a “greatly increased clarity 
of vision.” 
Misinformation Effect 
My first goal in Experiment 1 was to replicate Clifasefi et al.'s (2007) finding that 
a sham cognitive enhancing drug could protect subjects from the misinformation effect. 
To examine Told Drug and Told Inactive subjects’ susceptibility to misinformation I 
calculated each subject’s mean correct responses to the four control questions and the 
four misled questions, and classified these scores according to whether I told subjects 
that I had given them the active or inactive version of R273. I display these means in 
Figure 2.5.  
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Figure 2.5. Mean number of items correct by drug instruction. 
 
As the figure shows, regardless of what subjects were told about their substance, 
all subjects were better at correctly remembering control items than they were at 
correctly remembering misled items, F (1, 94) = 58.66, p < .001, ηp2= .38. In other 
words, comparing just the white bars and just the grey bars, shows there was a 
misinformation effect in both the Told Drug, t (47) = 3.79, p < .001, Cohen’s d = .55, 
and Told Inactive conditions, t (47) = 7.18, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 1.04. But were Told 
Drug subjects any more resistant to the misleading information than their Told Inactive 
counterparts? The answer is yes: comparing the white and grey bar on the right hand 
side of the dotted line shows that Told Drug subjects were more accurate than their 
Told Inactive counterparts on misled items, t (94)= 2.47, p = .02, Cohen’s d = .49. In 
addition, Told Drug subjects’ resistance was not merely a consequence of better 
memory for the event; comparing the white and grey bars on the right side of the dotted 
line shows that Told Drug subjects were as accurate as Told Inactive subjects on control 
items, t (94)= .11, p = .91, ns. In other words, the interaction between PEI and drug 
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instruction suggests that the sham cognitive enhancing drug reduced subjects’ 
susceptibility to the misinformation effect, F (1, 94) = 4.43, p = .04, ηp2= .05. 
 In sum, these findings on accuracy show that I replicated the basic pattern of 
findings from Clifasefi et al. (2007): I found that both Told Drug and Told Inactive 
subjects performed equally well on control items, however, Told Drug subjects had 
better memories than Told Inactive subjects for misled items.  
These findings fit with the literature on source monitoring and the 
misinformation effect. Specifically, these results suggest that Told Drug subjects were 
better able to monitor the sources of information from the event and PEI and thus 
reduce their susceptibility to false memories. The results also fit with a growing body of 
literature demonstrating that source monitoring is affected by social information 
(Johnson et al., 1993, Lindsay, 2008). In particular, subjects’ ability to use effective 
source monitoring, and whether or not subjects capitulate to misleading information, 
can be guided not only by their expectations and beliefs about the misinformation 
messenger, but also about themselves (Assefi & Garry, 2003; Dodd & Bradshaw, 1980; 
Clifasefi et al., 2007; Echterhoff et al., 2005; French et al., 2008; Vornik et al., 2003).  
Although these results tell us about R273’s ability to affect memory accuracy 
they do not tell us about R273’s ability to affect source monitoring. To determine how 
R273 might affect source monitoring I examined subjects’ reading speeds and response 
times during the PEI and the memory test. 
Evidence of Source Monitoring 
My second goal in Experiment 1 was to find empirical support for the 
hypothesis that R273 causes Told Drug subjects to engage in more stringent source 
monitoring during the PEI or memory test. I hypothesised that Told Drug subjects 
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might use more effortful source monitoring during the reading of the PEI, at the test, or 
both.  
Reading Speed. Greene et al. (1982) and Tousignant et al. (1986) found that 
subjects who slowed down their reading speed of the PEI and increased their 
discrepancy detection, were less susceptible to misleading information. If R273 leads 
people to engage in more stringent source monitoring, I might expect Told Drug 
subjects to read the misleading portions of the summary more slowly than Told Inactive 
subjects.  
To address this issue, I calculated each subject’s mean reading time of the filler 
passages—text about neither control nor misled items—and then did the same for 
passages containing misled items. These results appear in Figure 2.6. Because I found 5 
outliers—3 in the Told Drug condition and 2 in the Told Inactive condition—I used 
two statistical techniques in order address this research question. I first conducted a 2 x 
2 mixed ANOVA to examine whether the information that subjects received about their 
substance affected the speed with which they read the misled and control portions of 
the narrative. The result suggested that drug condition had no effect on subjects’ 
reading speeds, F < 1. In order to make sure this result was not due to the outliers in 
the dataset reducing the statistical power of the ANOVA, I next performed an M-
estimator robust regression to determine whether the speed with which subjects read 
the narrative was related to the drug instruction. Yaffe (2002) suggests that robust 
regression is the preferred statistical test when the assumption of equal error variance is 
violated by the presence of outliers. The method is an increasingly popular statistical 
alternative to ordinary least squares (OLS) regression and also has the added virtue of 
being supported by the APA task force on statistics (Wilkinson et al., 1999; Wright & 
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London, 2007). In M-estimator robust regression—a form of weighted least squares 
regression—weights are assigned to the residuals. Small residuals receive an assigned 
weight of 1 while large residuals (outliers) receive small weights. The method minimises 
the impact that outliers make to the overall model by dampening their contribution 
without any loss of data. The resulting model is a good fit to the majority of the data 
and is more statistically sound than methods that trim and remove outliers altogether 
(Bellio & Ventura, 2005; Wright & London, 2008). 
Once I controlled for baseline reading speed of the filler portions, drug 
condition still did not predict how long people took to read the misleading or control 
parts of the narrative, t’s (93) < 1, ns. That is, I found no evidence that Told Drug 
subjects used more effortful source monitoring during the narrative than their Told 
Inactive counterparts; as the white and grey bars show in Figure 2.6 reading speed for 
misled and control portions of the narrative was the same. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.6. Mean reading speed of PEI passages that contained a critical item by drug instruction. 
 
Reaction Time. If R273 does not increase Told Drug subjects’ source monitoring 
during the PEI, does it affect their source monitoring during the test? Recall that I 
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predicted that more stringent source monitoring at test might lead Told Drug subjects 
to respond to misleading test items more slowly than Told Inactive subjects. To address 
this prediction, I calculated baseline response time by determining the mean amount of 
time each person took to answer filler items—items that both Told Drug and Told 
Inactive subjects should have answered quickly and effortlessly. I then did the same for 
misled items and control items. Because I identified four outliers in my data set, I again 
used two statistical methods for determining whether the drug instruction affected 
subjects’ response times on the test. The 2 x 2 mixed ANOVA suggested that there was 
a marginally significant interaction between the drug instruction and subjects’ response 
speeds, F (1, 94) = 2.96, p = .09 ηp2 = .03. To further examine where R273 might be 
affecting response times, and to increase the power of the test, I used two robust 
regressions with both drug instruction and filler response time to predict how long 
subjects took to respond to misled and control questions on the memory test. By using 
the robust regressions, the effect of the outliers was minimised. 
After controlling for how long subjects took to respond to the filler test 
questions, I found that the information subjects received about their substance was a 
significant predictor of how long they took to respond to misled items, t (93) = -2.16, p 
= .03, Cohen’s d = .34, but not control items, t < 1, ns. In other words, Figure 2.7 shows 
that Told Drug subjects answered misled test questions more slowly than their Told 
Inactive counterparts, and more slowly than they answered the filler questions. The 
figure also shows that Told Inactive subjects responded as quickly to misled test 
questions as they did to filler test questions. This pattern of results lends support to the 
hypothesis that Told Drug subjects used slower and more deliberate source monitoring 
for misled items.  
 59 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.7 Mean response time to answer critical item questions during the memory test by drug 
instruction. 
 
In summary, the response time findings lend support to the hypothesis that 
Told Drug subjects used more effortful and deliberate decision processes during the test 
than their Told Inactive counterparts. More specifically, the results suggest that instead 
of responding quickly and automatically, Told Drug subjects slowed down their 
responding—deliberating more carefully over the qualitative characteristics of their 
memories—and were less misled. In addition, this pattern of findings converge with the 
studies whose results suggest that subjects who use a slower and more careful response 
strategy on the memory test tend to be more accurate than subjects who respond 
quickly (Echterhoff et al., 2005).  
Confidence 
Thus far, the results suggest that R273 affects Told Drug subjects’ accuracy and 
their speed of responding to misled items on the memory test. But does R273 affect 
subjects’ subjective appraisals of their memories? To examine this question each 
subject’s mean confidence was calculated for the four control and four misled test 
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questions, and then classified these means according to whether subjects were in the 
Told Drug or Told Inactive condition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.8. Mean confidence for control and misled items by drug instruction (Told Drug or Told 
Inactive). 
 
As Figure 2.8 shows, regardless of what subjects were told about their drug, they 
were more confident about their responses to misleading items than control items, F (1, 
94) = 66.85, p < .01, ηp2 = .42  (see also Assefi & Garry, 2003; Loftus et al., 1989). 
However, a marginal interaction between what subjects were told about their substance 
and their confidence shows that subjects were not equally confident in their control and 
misled memories F (1, 94) = 3.56, p = .06, ηp2 = .04. Follow-up pairwise comparisons 
showed that while Told Drug and Told Inactive subjects were similarly confident of 
their answers to control items, t < 1, ns, Told Inactive subjects were more confident of 
their misled answers t (94) = 2.99, p < .001, Cohen’s d = .62. 
These results, like those obtained on accuracy and response time, lend support 
to the hypothesis that Told Drug subjects used more cognitive effort during the 
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memory test than Told Inactive subjects in two ways. First, research suggests that when 
subjects experience an answer as coming to mind easily, and that answer seems familiar, 
they are more confident that they are correct regardless of whether they are correct 
(Kelley & Lindsay, 1993). Second, research suggests that when subjects experience a 
memory as being difficult to retrieve, they infer from this difficulty that the memory is 
incomplete or fragmented (Belli, Winkielmen, Read, Schwarz & Lynn, 1998). The 
confidence findings converge with these lines of research: Told Inactive subjects’ 
reaction time data suggests they responded to misled items in the quick and effortless 
manner on the basis of familiarity. As such, it seems unlikely that Told Inactive subjects 
would have questioned the accuracy of their answers to misled test questions. 
Conversely, Told Drug subjects’ reaction time data suggests they responded to misled 
items slowly and carefully. Consequently, Told Drug subjects might have inferred from 
their increased cognitive effort that their memories are inconsistent, fragmented or 
incomplete.  
Next I examined subjects’ confidence in their true memories (correct responses 
to control items) and false memories (incorrect answers on misled items). These data 
appear in Figure 2.9  
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Figure 2.9. Mean confidence for correct responses on control items (true memories) and incorrect 
responses on misled items (false memories) by drug instruction (Told Drug or Told Inactive). 
 
As the figure illustrates, subjects were more confident of their false memories 
than their true memories, as shown by a main effect for PEI, F (1, 89) = 4.48, p = .04, 
ηp2 = .05. However, as shown by a marginal main effect for condition, F (1, 89) = 3.55, 
p = .06, ηp2= .04, Told Drug subjects were less confident than Told Inactive subjects in 
both their true and false memories. These results fit with the findings for overall 
confidence, and once again suggest that Told Drug subjects might have used more 
cognitive effort on the memory test than their Told Inactive counterparts.  
WMC  
My third goal in Experiment 1 was to investigate whether WMC was related to 
the effectiveness of R273; I expected to see a relationship between OSPAN and 
subjects’ resistance to misleading suggestion among Told Drug but not among Told 
Inactive subjects.  
To examine this issue, I first obtained OSPAN scores from the 693 subjects 
who took part in mass testing, and found 76 of whom had later volunteered for the 
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R273 experiment. Of these 76 volunteers, 36 had been randomly assigned to the Told 
Drug condition, and 40 to the Told Inactive condition. Mean OSPAN score did not 
differ between conditions, MDrug = 45.44 (SD = 17.00), and MInactive = 40.28 (SD = 
21.12), t (74) = 1.17, p = .12, ns.  
Next, to examine whether WMC was associated with subjects’ susceptibility to 
misleading information partial correlations were calculated between subjects’ OSPAN 
scores and their misled performance, while controlling for subjects‘ overall belief in the 
drug2. An overall belief score was calculated by summing the scores across the six 
cognitive effects on manipulation check.  
The zero-order correlations indicated that there was no relationship between 
subjects’ OSPAN scores and their performance on misled items. However, there was a 
negative correlation between OSPAN scores and belief in the drug indicating that the 
higher subjects’ OSPAN, the less likely they were to say that they experienced the 
effects of R273.  Thus, to examine what happens to OSPAN and misled performance 
when belief is controlled, I conducted a series of partial correlations. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 Partial correlation is a technique used in the “causal” modeling of small models 
consisting of 3-5 variables. According to Cohen et al. 2003 the partial correlation technique asks 
whether when a third variable is held constant, is the relationship between x and y the same as 
when the third variable was ignored. 
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Table 2.2 Zero-order correlations between measures without controlling for belief and misled item 
performance 
 Drug Condition 
 Told Drug Told Inactive 
 OSPAN Belief Misled OSPAN Belief Misled 
OSPAN 1 -.45* .37 1 -.11 .05 
Belief -.45* 1 .34** -.11 1 .03 
Misled .37 .34** 1 .05 .03 1 
* = p < .01   ** = p < .05 
 
Once belief was controlled for, I found in the Told Drug condition WMC was 
related to subjects’ susceptibility to misinformation: the higher a subject’s WMC in the 
Told Drug condition, the less likely they were to be misled. In the Told Inactive 
condition, WMC was unrelated to subjects’ susceptibility to misinformation. In other 
words, WMC was significantly associated with resistance to misleading suggestion 
among Told Drug subjects, but not among Told Inactive subjects, pr(33) = .38, p =.02; 
pr(37) = .06, p =.72, ns, respectively.  
In source monitoring terms, these results fit with the idea that in situations that 
demand controlled, effortful attention, people with a higher WMC are better able to 
monitor the sources of their memories and block out the interfering, misleading PEI. 
While WMC was not associated with subjects’ resistance to misleading PEI in the Told 
Inactive condition, WMC was associated with subjects’ resistant to misleading PEI in 
the Told Drug condition. These results converge with the evidence from Watson et al. 
(2005) who found that subjects with higher spans were better able to heed a warning 
about a false memory effect than their lower span counterparts.  
The working memory results of Experiment 1 also fit with a larger body of 
research showing that in certain conditions, higher spans possess an advantage over 
lower spans. For example, Kane et al., (2007) examined whether higher and lower spans 
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differ in the amount of mind wandering they experience throughout the day. Subjects 
were given Intel Corporation Palm Pilot personal digital assistants (PDAs: model m100, 
m125, or m130) that beeped randomly eight times a day. When the PDA beeped, 
subjects completed questionnaires that recorded what they were doing at the time and if 
their minds had wandered during their current task. Kane et al. found that higher spans 
differed only in the amount of mind wandering that they did during cognitively 
demanding tasks. That is, when the task that the subjects were engaged in demanded 
effortful attention, higher spans were better able to keep their attention focused and 
their minds on the task at hand.  
Summary 
Experiment 1 produced three important results. First, R273 reduced subjects’ 
susceptibility to misleading information. While all subjects performed equally well on 
control items—indicating that the misled performance was not a by-product of better 
overall memory of the event—Told Drug subjects were less likely than Told Inactive 
subjects to report the incorrect PEI item on the memory test. What is more, I found 
support for the idea that this increase in accuracy might be due to Told Drug subjects’ 
source monitoring at test: Told Drug subjects were slower to respond to misled test 
questions than their Told Inactive counterparts. This finding fits with an SMF tenet that 
the decision processes people use to determine the sources of their memories play an 
important role in their ability to correctly attribute source to a memory. By slowing 
down their responding on the test, it is possible that Told Drug subjects examined more 
qualitative characteristics of their memories and selected their answers not solely on the 
basis of familiarity. Finally, these results suggest that R273’s effectiveness is related to 
WMC; OSPAN was associated with better resistance to misleading suggestion—
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especially when subjects were told they would receive R273. Taken as whole, the results 
of Experiment 1 suggest that R273 decreases the misinformation effect because it 
affects subjects’ behaviours during the memory test.  
This pattern of results extends the literature examining postwarnings and 
people’s resistance to the misinformation effect (Chambers & Zaragoza, 2001; Meade & 
Roediger, 2002; Echterhoff et al., 2005). Recall that Echterhoff et al., (2005) gave 
subjects a postwarning about the misinformation messenger and found that warned 
subjects were slower to respond to misled test questions and more accurate. In my 
study, however, I did not suggest to subjects that R273 may be more effective during a 
particular part of the method, nor did I tell them in the cover story that R273 affects 
memory. R273 was administered before subjects watched the event, and subjects used 
their response expectancies about R273 to guide their source monitoring during the 
memory test.  
To align the R273 method more directly with the postwarning literature, and to 
find convergent evidence that R273 works because it affects subjects’ source monitoring 
during the memory test the aim of my next experiment was to target subjects’ source 
monitoring behaviours at test. To address this question, Experiment 2 used a design 
whereby all subjects were told that they had received an inactive placebo. Then 
immediately before the memory test some subjects were informed that they had actually 
received the cognitive enhancing drug R273.  
 67 
Chapter 3 
 Experiment 2: R273 administered before a memory test reduces the 
misinformation effect 
The results of Experiment 1 suggest that R273 increased Told Drug subjects’ 
resistance to the misinformation effect by leading them to use slower and more effortful 
source monitoring during the memory test. Yet these results do not rule out the 
possibility that Told Drug subjects’ source monitoring during the PEI was affected in 
ways beyond that which could be detected with a measure of reading speed, nor the 
possibility that Told Drug subjects changed their source monitoring in between the PEI 
and memory test. Therefore, the next step was to investigate whether giving subjects 
R273 immediately before the memory test would provide a similar pattern of results to 
Experiment 1. If administering R273 immediately before the memory test reduced the 
misinformation effect, there would be further evidence to suggest that R273 “works” 
because it affects subjects’ source monitoring during the test. Literature on 
postwarnings, source monitoring and the misinformation effect shed light on how this 
reduction might occur.  
As discussed in Chapter 2, studies show that when subjects receive direct and 
explicit warnings before the memory test, alerting them to the discrepancies between 
the event and the PEI, they are less misled. Specifically, telling subjects that some of the 
details in the PEI are incorrect, enlisting the help of a confederate to accuse the 
experimenters of deliberately trying to trick subjects, and warning subjects that their 
discussion partner might have made mistakes, are some of the ways that postwarnings 
have been used to increase subjects’ resistance to misleading suggestion (Chambers and 
Zaragoza, 2001; Christiaansen & Ochalek , 1983; Meade & Roediger 2002). Similarly, 
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research using a Dodd and Bradshaw (1980) type of warning that brings the credibility 
of the misinformation messenger into question, has also successfully led subjects to 
resist the effects of misleading postevent suggestion (Echterhoff et al., 2005). Taken as a 
whole, there is ample evidence suggesting that the memory-distorting effects of 
misleading PEI can be reduced by subjects’ behaviours at test, if they are provided with 
a warning about the PEI. A warning may potentially lead subjects to scrutinise the 
source of their memories more carefully during the test and use more careful and 
effortful monitoring processes. 
Another body of literature also sheds light on the important role that source 
monitoring plays during the memory test, and comes directly from studies that have 
used explicit source monitoring tests—as opposed to 2AFC recognition tests—in 
misinformation effect experiments. Specifically, another way of increasing subjects’ 
resistance is to simply give them a source monitoring test. On a source monitoring test, 
subjects are encouraged to use processes different from the familiarity-driven processes 
in the standard 2AFC or yes/no recognition tests (Johnson et al., 1993; Lindsay & 
Johnson, 1989). Recall from Chapter 1 that the typical format of a source monitoring 
test asks subjects to examine all possible sources of their memory in order to attribute a 
source to an item. Specifically, subjects are asked to classify whether an item came from 
the slides, the narrative, both, or neither. In making this classification, a subject who saw 
the math book and then read about a computer book might think, "I think I saw the 
math book, but I also think I read about a computer book." Such a process should 
encourage subjects to retrieve even more qualitative characteristics of “seen” and “read” 
items, highlight the qualitative differences between them, and deliberate more carefully 
than they would in a 2AFC test. Consequently, a certain portion of subjects who take a 
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source monitoring test, and engage in these more effortful decision processes, should 
shift away from adopting the familiar yet misleading "computer" suggestion compared 
to subjects who took the recognition test. Subsequently, a number of studies—such as 
those reviewed in Chapter 1—have directly compared source monitoring tests to 
recognition tests and reliably show that source monitoring tests can reduce, and in some 
cases even eliminate, the misinformation effect (Lindsay & Johnson, 1989; Zaragoza & 
Koshmider, 1989; Zaragoza & Lane, 1994).  
As a whole, the findings on postwarnings, the misinformation effect and source 
monitoring suggest that an instruction after the PEI that increases effortful source 
monitoring should decrease the misinformation effect. Yet research examining 
postwarnings and the misinformation effect has used manipulations that either directly 
alerted subjects to the erroneous nature of the PEI—by telling them about the 
discrepancies or by insinuating that the misinformation messenger is not credible—or 
by using explicit source monitoring tests. To date, no research has examined whether an 
instruction before test that says nothing about the PEI, or the source of the PEI, can 
reduce the misinformation effect. Therefore, administering R273 immediately before 
the memory test would answer two important questions. First, considered in concert 
with the findings of Experiment 1, administering the drug instruction immediately 
before subjects take the memory test would provide further evidence on whether R273 
“works” because it changes Told Drug subjects’ source monitoring only during the 
memory test. Second, it would also fill a gap in the postwarning literature that has 
established that explicit postwarnings reduce the misinformation effect, but has not 
established whether implicit postwarnings—warnings that say nothing about the 
discrepancies in the PEI nor its source—reduce the misinformation effect. If I find that 
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telling subjects about R273 immediately before the memory test still reduces their 
susceptibility to misinformation, it would be the first study showing that an implicit 
warning that says nothing about memory or the erroneous nature of the PEI, is able to 
change subjects’ source monitoring at test and thus reduce their susceptibility to 
misinformation. 
Method 
Subjects 
Ninety-six undergraduate psychology students participated for course credit. 
Subjects took part in groups of no more than three and did not talk to each other 
during the session. 
Design  
The experiment used a 2 x 2 mixed design with drug instruction at test (Told 
Drug or Told Inactive) as the between-subjects factor, and PEI (control or misled) as 
the within-subjects factor.  
Materials and Procedure  
The procedure in Experiment 2 was exactly the same as in Experiment 1, with 
two exceptions (see Figure 3.1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    Figure 3.1. An overview of the method used in Experiment 2 
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First, because I was not examining subjects’ WMC in Experiment 2, I did not 
collect OSPAN data. Second, during the drug administration phase, all subjects were 
told that they had been assigned to receive the inactive version of the drug. Then, after 
subjects had taken their substance, read the PEI narrative, and completed the filler task, 
I told everybody that I had misinformed some subjects about the contents of their drug.  
Specifically I told subjects: 
 
 In clinical drug studies we use one of several techniques to examine the 
effectiveness of a particular drug. One commonly used technique is called the 
balanced behavioural separation technique {a made-up name for the purpose of the 
study}. This technique is very helpful because it allows us to identify abnormal 
or unusual patterns of responding from participants. We try to identify these 
subjects by using a number of techniques and one of these techniques is to 
run some sessions where I don't tell you the true nature of the substance 
you're taking until later on in the session. I will now reveal to you which group 
you are in. 
 
 Half the subjects were then truthfully told that they had received the inactive 
drug (Told Inactive); half the subjects were told they had received the active drug (Told 
Drug). Immediately after subjects were informed of their drug condition they took the 
memory test. 
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Results and discussion 
Manipulation Check  
As in Experiment 1, I first examined whether Told Drug subjects would report 
that they had experienced drug effects, in line with some of R273's response 
expectancies.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2. Mean score for the manipulation checks by drug instruction  
 
Figure 3.2 shows a pattern of results similar to those obtained in Experiment 1: 
Told Drug subjects reported feeling more effects of R273 than the Told Inactive 
subjects, F (1, 94) = 35.33, p < .01, •p
2 = .27. Once again however, Told Drug subjects 
did not report the benefits of R273 on all six measures, as shown by the interaction 
between drug instruction and cognitive abilities rating, F (5, 90) = 4.18, p < .01, •p
2 = 
.19. Follow up t-tests revealed that Told Drug subjects rated every cognitive ability 
significantly higher than the Told Inactive subjects (all p’s < .01) except for thinking, p = 
.65  
Subjects’ comments once again fit with these empirical findings. For example, 
one subject wrote that “I was tired before the experiment and noticed a definite rise in 
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awareness after the short clip...I soon became aware that I may not have taken the 
placebo as I felt much more focused than before.” Subjects 15, 20, and 53 reported 
feeling “more alert,” while subject 18 reported that he experienced a “slight head-rush” 
and subject 20 claimed that he felt “mild tingling in the fingers.” 
Misinformation Effect 
I now turn to my primary research question: was there empirical support for the 
prediction that R273 could act as an implicit postwarning, and produce effects similar to 
those obtained in Experiment 1? If so, I should find that Told Drug subjects were as 
accurate as Told Inactive subjects on control items, and that Told Drug subjects were 
more accurate than Told Inactive subjects on misled items. To address this issue, I first 
calculated each person's mean correct responses to the four misled and four control 
questions, and then classified these means according to whether I told subjects that I 
had given them the active or inactive version of R273. Because I found four outliers—
one in the Told Drug group and three in the Told Inactive group—I used both a 2 x 2 
mixed ANOVA to determine the effect of drug instruction on memory accuracy, and an 
M-estimator robust regression, which minimises the effect of the outliers and provides a 
model with a better fit to the majority of the data, and increased power.  
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Figure 3.3. Mean number of items correct by drug instruction 
 
As Figure 3.3 shows, R273 caused a pattern of responses similar to those 
obtained in Experiment 1; regardless of what subjects were told about their substance, 
all subjects were better at correctly remembering control items than they were at 
correctly remembering misled items, F (1, 94) = 47.05, p < .001, ηp2= .38. In other 
words, comparing just the white bars and just the grey bars, shows there was a 
misinformation effect in both the Told Drug, t (47) = 3.56, p < .001, Cohen’s d = .70, 
and Told Inactive conditions, t (47) = 5.99, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 1.22. But were Told 
Drug subjects any more resistant to the misleading information than their Told Inactive 
counterparts? The bars on the left side of the dotted line suggest that Told Drug and 
Told Inactive subjects were similarly accurate on control items;3 the bars on the right 
side of the dotted line show that Told Drug subjects were more accurate on misled 
                                                 
3 The control bars on Figure 4.2 appear to show Told Inactive subjects having slightly 
better memory performance than Told Drug subjects. However, the robust regression revealed 
that their performance was not significantly different. To ensure that this pattern of results was 
not simply due to a lack of power I conducted analyses in G-Power (Faul et al., 2006) to 
calculate the least significant number of subjects. The analysis showed that with power of .95 I 
required at least 486 subjects to detect a difference between Told Drug and Told Inactive 
subjects for control items (Cohen’s d = .30). Therefore I concluded that it was not lack of power 
that resulted in non-significant findings.  
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items than their Told Inactive counterparts. This finding was qualified by a significant 
interaction between what subjects were told and PEI type, F (1, 94) = 4.76, p = .03, ηp2 
= .05. However, follow up t-tests suggested that there was not enough power to detect 
a difference between Told Drug and Told Inactive subjects’ performance for control 
and misled items. Thus, two robust regressions were carried out, in order to increase the 
statistical power of the test. The M-estimator robust regression showed that what 
subjects were told about the drug did not predict their memory performance on control 
items, t (94) = 1.44, p = .15, ns, but did predict their memory performance on misled 
items, t (94) = 2.08, p = .04, Cohen’s d = .32. These results suggest that giving subjects 
R273 acted similarly to a direct postwarning, and produced response expectancies that 
were reflected in the form of more effortful and effective source monitoring.  
Response Time  
Next, I examined how long subjects took when they responded to misleading 
questions on the memory test. Recall that in Experiment 1, I found Told Drug subjects 
were slower to respond to misleading test items than were Told Inactive subjects. Based 
on this finding, I expected to find a similar pattern here. Because I found one outlier in 
the Told Drug condition, and two outliers in the Told Placebo condition, I conducted 
both a 2 x 2 mixed ANOVA and a robust regression, following the same procedure for 
analysing the reaction time data as in Experiment 1.  
As Figure 3.4 shows, I did not replicate the pattern of findings from Experiment 
1. That is, although Told Drug subjects took longer to answer the misled test items, the 
results of both the ANOVA and robust regression indicated they did not take 
significantly longer, F < 1, ns and t < 1, ns respectively. Yet when Told Drug subjects 
were correct, they were marginally slower at responding to misled test items than were 
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Told Inactive subjects, t (93) = -1.81, p = .07, Cohen’s d = .22, but were equally fast to 
respond to control items, t <1, ns.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4. Mean response time to answer critical item and filler questions during the memory test 
by drug instruction 
 
Although I expected to find convergent evidence for increased source 
monitoring in the form of Told Drug subjects' longer response times during the test, I 
did not. What am I to make of this result? One explanation is that the methodological 
differences between Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 affected both Told Drug and Told 
Inactive subjects’ behaviours at test. More specifically, the semi-debriefing that subjects 
received before the memory test may have alerted them to the fact that the study used 
deception. As a result, some subjects might have been puzzled as to why I was 
informing them of the deception and may have guessed that the study had an ulterior 
motive. In the same vein, the semi-debriefing that subjects received may have given 
Told Drug subjects a small boost to their confidence, thus causing them to increase 
their response times and answer the test questions more quickly than the Told Drug 
subjects in Experiment 1. Thus it is possible that a portion of suspicious Told Inactive 
subjects increased their source monitoring, scrutinising their memories more carefully 
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and slowing down their responding on the memory test, while a portion of Told Drug 
subjects decreased their source monitoring, deliberating less carefully and responding to 
misled test questions more quickly, causing the difference between Told Drug and Told 
Inactive subjects’ response times to disappear. Indeed, comparing subjects’ response 
times across Experiments 1 and 2 (see Table 3.1), suggests that Told Inactive subjects 
were slightly slower than Told Inactive subjects in Experiment 1, while Told Drug 
subjects were slightly faster than Told Drug subjects in Experiment 1. This change in 
response time could explain why I failed to find a difference. Yet if this is the case, I 
might expect to see these response time changes reflected in subjects’ accuracy on 
misled test questions—but I do not. Thus, I do not find this counter explanation a 
compelling account of why I failed to replicate the reaction time findings in  
Experiment 2. 
 
Table 3.1. Means and Standard Deviations for Reaction Time (Misled) across Experiments 1 and 2 
                                 Drug Condition 
 Told Drug 
 
Told Inactive 
 Mean SD Mean SD 
RT (ms) 
Experiment 1 
5694.24 2572.13 4995.57 1400.78 
RT (ms) 
Experiment 2 
5422.84 1559.76 5280.29 1587.74 
 
 Another more likely explanation, is that given my maximum sample size—an 
allocation from the department participant pool—an a priori power analysis based on 
data from Experiment 1 suggested very good statistical power to answer the primary 
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research question (Power = .97)4 but far less power to detect response time differences 
(Power =  .23). Of course, I should not take this lack of a significant effect to mean that 
Told Drug subjects did not engage in more deliberate and careful source monitoring at 
test because source monitoring involves many attributes, and I measured only one of 
these attributes (Johnson et al., 1988). One possibility is that Told Drug subjects might 
have set a higher criteria or threshold on the qualitative characteristics of their memories 
than their Told Inactive counterparts (Hekkanen & McEvoy, 2002). That is, Told Drug 
subjects may have required more qualitative characteristics, or a greater amount of one 
particular qualitative characteristic, before they accepted or rejected an item. If indeed a 
criteria shift did occur, this shift in behaviour would not necessarily be detected using a 
measure of reaction time. In addition, both the objective empirical data on subjects’ 
memory performance and their own self-reports suggest that they experienced clear 
benefits from taking a substance that does nothing to change their abilities.  
Confidence  
Did telling subjects that they had taken R273 make them more confident in 
either their control or misled answers? As Figure 3.5 shows, the answer is no: both Told 
Drug subjects and Told Inactive subjects were more confident of their responses to 
misled items than control items, regardless of what they were told about their drug (see 
also Assefi & Garry, 2003; Loftus et al., 1989). In short, a 2 (drug instruction) x 2 (PEI) 
mixed ANOVA, showed a main effect for PEI F (1, 94) = 30.58, p < .01, •p
2 = .25, and 
no effect for drug instruction F < 1.  
 
                                                 
4 I conducted power analyses in G-Power (Faul et al., 2006). 
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Figure 3.5. Mean confidence for control and misled items by drug instruction 
 
 
Did telling subjects that they had taken R273 affect their confidence in either 
their true or false memories? Again the answer is no: while the pattern of results showed 
that Told Drug subjects were slightly more confident of their true memories, and less 
confident, of their false this pattern did not reach statistical significance. In other words, 
there was no interaction between PEI and condition, F (1, 89) = 2.27, p = .14, ns, and 
no main effects for either PEI or condition, F’s < 1, ns. 
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Figure 3.6. Mean confidence for correct responses on control items (true memories) and 
incorrect responses on misled items (false memories) by drug instruction. 
 
In sum, the confidence data did not replicate the pattern of results that I 
obtained in Experiment 1: the drug instruction did not affect subjects’ subjective 
appraisals of their memories. 
Summary 
Experiment 2 aimed to find further evidence that the R273 placebo effect 
occurs because of subjects’ source monitoring during the memory test. The primary 
finding supported this prediction: subjects who were told they had received R273 
immediately before taking the memory test were less misled than their Told Inactive 
counterparts. However a secondary finding did not lend support to this prediction. 
Specifically, I failed to find a significant difference between Told Drug and Told 
Inactive subjects’ response time on misled test questions. However, while this non 
significant finding is at first perplexing, there is some evidence to suggest that the 
response time pattern of results is due to lack of power.  
Experiment 2 has both practical and theoretical implications. Theoretically the 
results obtained in Experiment 2 contribute to the literatures on source monitoring and 
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the misinformation effect by showing that the processes that people use during the 
memory test can lead them to resist the effects of erroneous and misleading postevent 
suggestion. More specifically, because R273 was administered immediately before the 
memory test, this reduction in susceptibility to misleading information can only be 
attributed to subjects’ source monitoring during the test, and not during the encoding of 
the event or during the PEI. Thus the findings of Experiment 2 are in concert with 
Experiment 1 and, taken together, suggest that a sham drug can reduce the 
misinformation effect by setting in motion behaviours that override subjects’ tendencies 
to rely on automatic and non-conscious behaviours. Indeed the results suggest that 
R273 causes subjects to switch from their usual automatic and effortless processing to 
more deliberate and effortful strategies.  
Experiment 2 also has practical implications and mimics more closely than 
Experiment 1 what could occur in a real-world eyewitness situation. Recall that the drug 
administration phase in Experiment 1 occurred before subjects watched the event, but 
in a real-world situation, witnesses usually do not know when they are going to see a 
crime and therefore, cannot presciently take a memory-enhancing drug before it occurs. 
In Experiment 2 on the other hand, the drug administration occurred after subjects 
watched the event and received PEI about that event. It is possible that police 
interviewers might one day have a number of promising techniques to reduce 
eyewitness memory error, even after those eyewitnesses have been exposed to the 
contaminating effects of misleading postevent suggestion. In sum, while eyewitnesses 
cannot necessarily prepare themselves for when they will see a crime, they can adjust 
their behaviours when they recall that crime, which leads to them being more accurate. 
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Second, the results of this experiment extend those of Experiment 1 showing 
that subjects’ beliefs about their own abilities can protect them from the effects of 
misleading suggestion. This belief can be induced in witnesses without directly telling 
them about the misleading PEI or mentioning the word memory. Taken together, these 
experiments suggest that witnesses might be able to motivate themselves to use more 
careful source monitoring and disregard erroneous and misleading PEI.  
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Chapter 4 
Experiment 3: A psychotropic placebo can improve prospective 
memory 
Einstein and McDaniel (2004) report that on a day-to-day basis the most 
common type of memory failure experienced by both young and old adults is forgetting 
to perform intended future actions—prospective memory (PM). In some cases 
forgetting to remember proves nothing more than a mere annoyance; in other cases 
forgetting to remember proves deadly. For example, on 2 October 1996 Aeroperu 
Flight 603 crashed into the Pacific Ocean killing everyone onboard. An investigation 
into the cause of the crash revealed that the most likely explanation was a PM failure: a 
plane technician forgot to remove a piece of tape that he had placed over a vital piece of 
equipment during routine cleaning (Ladkin, 1997). Thus, with PM playing such an 
important role in people’s everyday lives, and with the consequences of PM failures 
ranging so vastly in their ramifications, psychologists are interested in understanding the 
cognitive processes underlying PM.  
The Underlying Cognitive Processes of Prospective Memory 
 Our days and our heads are filled with things to remember: turn on the house 
alarm before you leave for work; pick up the kids from cricket practice at 4.30; put out 
the rubbish for collection in the morning, and so on. But among the myriad PM tasks 
we must remember to perform each and every day, are the attention absorbing, ongoing 
tasks such as writing that upcoming lecture, watching the latest episode of Lost or 
conversing with friends. Therefore, a critical component of PM is bringing the intended 
action to mind, in the absence of an explicit request to remember, and performing it at 
the right time in the face of ongoing distraction (McDaniel & Einstein, 2000). To 
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address how people remember PM tasks—or put another way, how they remember to 
put out the rubbish—McDaniel and Einstein (2000) propose the multiple-processes 
framework.  
The Multiple Processes Framework  
The central tenet of the multiple-processes framework is that prospective 
remembering occurs through one of two processes. On the one hand, remembering can 
occur through controlled and effortful monitoring whereby people actively monitor their 
environments and ultimately remind themselves of what they need to do. According to 
McDaniel and Einstein (2000), when people form an intention to perform an action in 
the future, an attentional system actively monitors the environment until it is time to 
perform that action. When appropriate, the attentional system interrupts the ongoing 
activity and initiates the processes necessary to perform the PM action. 
Because the monitoring approach can be thought as being similar to divided 
attention (e.g. attention is split between performing an ongoing task and monitoring the 
environment), research suggests that the more monitoring people use, the more 
detrimental effects are seen on ongoing task performance. For example, people are 
often slower to complete their ongoing task when they are using monitoring in order to 
remember their PM task (Marsh & Hicks, 1998; Smith, 2003). In addition, people are 
not always accurate at remembering to perform their PM task because constant 
monitoring is hard to sustain and easily disrupted (Einstein et al., 2005).  
On the other hand, successful prospective remembering can occur through an 
automatic and effortless spontaneous retrieval process whereby people rely on the cues of 
the situation to remind them about what they need to do. According to McDaniel and 
Einstein (2000), when people develop the intention to perform a PM action they form 
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an association between a target cue—something or someone that specifies that it is time 
to perform the action—and the intended action. When this cue is encountered, an 
automatic associative system delivers the intended action to mind. Because spontaneous 
retrieval demands fewer cognitive resources than monitoring, it is the more commonly 
used process (McDaniel & Einstein, 2007). 
Both subjective and objective evidence suggests that people use spontaneous 
retrieval in order to remember PM tasks. Subjectively, people report that the thought of 
the PM action just "pops" into mind. Also, probed at various points throughout an 
experiment people rarely mention thinking about the PM task. Objectively, when people 
use spontaneous retrieval, their PM performance remains high yet there are typically few 
costs observed to their concurrent and ongoing task (Einstein & McDaniel, 1990; Reese 
& Cherry, 2002; Einstein et al., 2005).  
If spontaneous retrieval is the less effortful of the two PM processes, and 
usually equates with people remembering to perform their intended PM action, why 
would people use monitoring in order to remember PM tasks? According to the 
literature, the process that people rely on is influenced by a number of factors—many 
beyond the scope of this thesis. However, two key factors have been identified. These 
two factors are the cues in the environment and the importance of the PM task. 
Cues 
Like many types of memory, PM can be facilitated by cues. For example, when 
we need to remember to put out the rubbish, we may encounter something in our 
environment that prompts us to remember this PM task. The effectiveness of these 
cues, however, depends heavily on the overlap between features of the cue and features 
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of the ongoing task. Consequently, cues are influential in determining the cognitive 
process used in order to retrieve the PM task. 
Focal cues: In some cases, there is high overlap between the ongoing task and the 
PM cue. In this instance the PM cue becomes focal because its relation to the ongoing 
task means that there is a high chance that it will be attended to, processed and brought 
into awareness. As a consequence, focal cues encourage spontaneous retrieval of the 
PM task. For example, imagine that it is Monday night—the night that you must 
remember to put out the rubbish (the PM task). You are in the kitchen making dinner 
(the ongoing task) and in the process, scrape a pile of scraps into the rubbish bin (focal cue). 
The action of putting the scraps into the rubbish bin brings the concept of “rubbish” 
directly into your awareness. Thus, upon opening the bin, you are automatically 
reminded that 1) it is rubbish night and 2) you should put the rubbish outside for 
collection. In this case, the presence of opening the bin prompts reflexive remembering 
of the PM task ("put out rubbish") without needing additional cognitive effort, attention 
and resources allocated to remembering the PM task. Therefore, focal cues typically 
demand spontaneous retrieval and encourage accurate PM performance, without 
causing detrimental effects to ongoing task performance. 
Nonfocal cues: On the other hand a PM cue might not form part of the 
information extracted from the ongoing task and is therefore harder for the cognitive 
system to detect. Thus, if a PM cue is less easily detected it becomes a nonfocal cue. For 
example, imagine once more that it is Monday night—the night that you must 
remember to put out the rubbish (the PM task). Instead of cooking dinner you are 
engrossed in watching your favourite show on TV (ongoing task). In the ad break you 
head into the kitchen and grab a snack out of the fridge before going back into the 
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lounge. Although the bin (the nonfocal cue) is in the kitchen and could be detected by your 
cognitive system, it is unlikely it will enter your awareness without conscious effort 
because the ongoing task does not call direct attention to it. Thus, nonfocal cues are 
unlikely to prompt spontaneous retrieval of the PM task: monitoring and allocating 
attentional resources to try and remember the task are likely to be the most successful 
methods of retrieving the PM task.  
Task Importance 
To recap, the process that people use to remember a PM task—spontaneous 
retrieval or monitoring—varies with the type of cues available in the environment. 
However, the strategies that people use also vary with the characteristics of the PM task, 
such as importance. In one study, Einstein et al. (2005) asked subjects to complete a 
laboratory based PM task. Subjects completed an ongoing word categorisation task (a 
task analogous to watching the TV programme or cooking dinner) but were also asked 
to remember to press a certain key when they encountered a certain type of cue (the PM 
task). Some subjects received focal cues that, because of the ongoing task, were likely to 
be processed and attended to (e.g. press the key when you see the word “Dormitory”). In 
this instance the cue is analogous to “rubbish bin” when you are putting scraps into the 
bin; subjects were likely to process and attend to the cue because their ongoing task 
brought direct attention to it. Other subjects received nonfocal cues that were unlikely 
to be attended to and detected without subjects using additional cognitive effort (e.g. 
press the key when you see the syllable “tor”). In this instance the cue is analogous to 
“rubbish bin” when the ongoing task consists of watching TV; subjects were unlikely to 
process and attend to the cue without additional cognitive effort because their ongoing 
task comprised of processing whole words and not just parts of words. Critically, 
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Einstein et al. also varied the perceived importance of the task: subjects were either told 
that it was very important that they remember to perform the PM task, or they were told 
that it was more important to correctly categorise the words.  
Einstein et al. (2005) found three key results. First, regardless of task 
importance, subjects remembered to perform the PM task—pressing a key—when they 
had a focal cue, compared to subjects who had a nonfocal cue. Einstein et al. reasoned 
that this was because the focal cue encouraged spontaneous and automatic retrieval of 
the PM action. Second, when subjects received high-importance instructions subjects’ 
performance on their ongoing task suffered. That is, when subjects thought that 
remembering the PM task was important there was evidence that they used monitoring 
in both the focal and nonfocal cue conditions and, as a result, subjects were slower to 
categorise the word-pairs during the ongoing task. Third, while the high-importance 
instructions increased monitoring in the focal and nonfocal conditions, subjects’ 
performance on the PM task only improved in the nonfocal condition. That is, the 
benefits of increased monitoring only occurred when the PM task demanded effort, 
attention and control. 
In sum, the literature reviewed thus far suggests that various factors influence 
whether people use spontaneous retrieval or monitoring in order to retrieve PM tasks. 
More specifically, these factors appear to play an influential role in the amount of 
cognitive effort that people use in order to remember their PM task. The idea that the 
amount of cognitive effort used can result in more or less memory accuracy brings the 
processes of PM into close alignment with those of source monitoring. 
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PM and Source Monitoring 
The reviewed literature suggests that the underlying processes of PM may share 
some similarities with those of source monitoring. First, both PM and source 
monitoring can occur via one of two processes: either through an automatic and 
effortless process, or through a deliberate and effortful process. Second, like source 
monitoring, the process that people use depends on the characteristics of the PM task. 
For example, when people think that the to-be-remembered task is important or 
difficult, they are more likely to rely on effortful monitoring. When people think that it 
is unimportant or easy to remember the to-be-remembered task, they are more likely to 
rely on effortless and automatic retrieval (Einstein et al., 2005; Kvavilashvili, 1987). This 
claim aligns closely with an SMF tenet suggesting that people will use deliberate 
effortful source monitoring in situations where they think it is important to correctly 
attribute source to a memory (e.g. testifying in court), and will use the “good enough” 
heuristic processes when there are little, if any, consequences for misattributing source 
to a memory (e.g. when telling a story to a friend; Johnson et al., 1993). Because of the 
similarities between PM and source monitoring, and because Experiments 1 and 2 
suggest that source monitoring can be influenced by people’s expectations about their 
own abilities, I hypothesised that R273 might also improve subjects’ prospective 
memories—but how?  
Experiments 1 and 2 suggest that Told Drug subjects switched from automatic 
and effortless source monitoring to effortful and deliberate source monitoring. 
Therefore, I predicted that R273 might lead Told Drug subjects to switch from 
automatic and effortless PM processing to effortful and deliberate PM processing. If so, 
I might find a similar pattern of results to those of Einstein et al. (2005). Specifically, I 
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predicted that if Told Drug subjects used more effortful monitoring than Told Inactive 
subjects, they should be better at remembering to perform a PM task, but only in a 
situation that demands this monitoring. That is, Told Drug subjects who receive a 
nonfocal cue should be better than Told Inactive subjects at remembering to perform 
the PM task; Told Drug subjects who receive a focal cue should be no better than Told 
Inactive subjects at remembering to perform the PM task. 
 Second, if telling subjects that they have received R273 increases their tendency 
to use effortful monitoring, we should see greater costs to Told Drug subjects’ 
performance during their ongoing task. More specifically, Told Drug subjects should 
take longer than Told Inactive subjects to categorise word-pairs, regardless of whether 
their cue to remember the PM task is focal or nonfocal.  
Method  
Subjects 
In total 96 subjects participated in the study. Seventy-seven were first year 
psychology students who took part in return for course credit; nineteen were recruited 
by advertising around the campus and received a $10 music or grocery voucher in 
return for their participation.  
Design 
The experiment used a 2 x 2 x 2 mixed design with drug instruction (Told Drug 
or Told Inactive) and word condition (focal or nonfocal) as the between-subjects 
factors, and presence of a PM task (Control or PM) as the within-subjects factor. 
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Materials and Procedure 
There were three phases to the procedure.  
Phases 1 and 2: The first two phases (cultivating response expectancies and drug 
administration) were the same as Phases 2 and 3 in Experiment 1. After subjects had 
taken their substance and watched the 10-minute action clip, Phase 3 began.  
Phase 3: Prospective Memory Phase. Phase 3 consisted of two halves that subjects 
completed on individual 14-inch iBooks. In one half subjects completed only an ongoing 
word categorisation task (Control half; see Figure 4.1); in the other half they completed an 
ongoing word-categorisation task and a PM task (Experimental half).  
For the ongoing word categorisation task, common to both the PM and control 
tasks, two 160 word-pair sets were created from the Battig and Montague (1969) 
norms.5 The sets were counterbalanced across both halves of Phase 3 so that each 
appeared equally often in the PM and control halves. The order of performing the PM 
and control halves was also counterbalanced so that half of the subjects performed the 
PM task first and half the subjects completed the control task first.  
All subjects had a short break between performing the PM and control halves of 
the experiment: during this break they completed the Mill Hill Vocabulary Test (Raven, 
1965) before continuing with the second half of Phase 3. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 Examples of materials used in Experiment 3 appear in the Appendices. 
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Figure 4.1. Overview of the procedure used in Experiment 4 
 
Control half. For the control half, subjects saw 160 word-pairs and were asked to 
decide as quickly as possible whether a lower case word on the left of the screen 
belonged to the category of an upper case word on the right of the screen. For example, 
if “green” and “COLOUR” appeared on the screen subjects should respond by pressing 
the “Y” key (Yes). If “green” and “ANIMAL” appeared subjects should respond by 
pressing the “N” key (No). The word pair stayed on the screen until a subject made a 
response and this response triggered the next word pair.  
Regardless of task order, all subjects initially received instructions on how to 
complete this ongoing word-categorisation task and then received 6 word-categorisation 
practice trials. After completing the practice trials subjects received instructions 
emphasising that their main goal was to complete the ongoing word trials as quickly and 
accurately as they could. Next, subjects were given 11 more practice trials that provided 
them with accuracy feedback. Subjects either then went on to perform the control task 
or they received the instructions for performing the PM task.  
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Experimental half. During the experimental half subjects completed 160 word-
categorisation trials but also performed a PM task. Subjects were told that their primary 
task was to complete the ongoing task, but were asked to ignore the ongoing word-
categorisation task and instead press the “Q” key whenever they saw a particular target 
item. Recall, Einstein et al. (2005) reasoned that a focal cue leads subjects to rely on 
spontaneous retrieval because they are likely to process and attend to the cue as they 
read the words for the ongoing task. Because they attend to the cue, they should be 
automatically reminded of the PM task. Nonfocal cues, however, lead subjects to rely on 
monitoring because they are less easily detected and processed, as the ongoing task does 
not call direct attention to them. Thus, in Experiment 3, varying whether subjects 
received a focal or nonfocal target cue manipulated the ease of performing this PM task. 
In the focal condition, half the subjects received a single target item tornado while the 
remaining half received the target item dormitory. Subjects in the nonfocal condition 
received the target item tor, which appeared once in each of the words dormitory, 
tornado, history and tortoise. The target item in both the focal and nonfocal conditions 
always occurred in positions 40, 120, 80 and 160. The word pair remained on the screen 
until a subject made a response and this response triggered the next word pair.  
Finally, subjects completed two short questionnaires used as manipulation 
checks. The first was the cognitive effects manipulation check from Experiments 1 and 
2. The second questionnaire asked subjects to indicate what their cue had been and 
which key they had pressed when they encountered the cue. The questionnaire also 
asked subjects to rate on a 1 (Not at all important) to 5 (Very important) scale their 
perceived importance of the ongoing task and PM tasks.  
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Results and Discussion 
Recall, the primary aim of Experiment 3 was to see if R273 could improve 
people’s prospective memories and whether it did so by leading them to use more 
cognitively demanding and effortful monitoring. Before I answered these primary 
questions however, I established that subjects correctly recalled their cue (Dormitory, 
Tornado or Tor) and the PM task (pressing the Q key), and whether the R273 drug 
manipulation worked. 
Manipulation checks 
Cognitive effects: As in Experiments 1 and 2, I first examined whether Told Drug 
subjects reported better cognitive abilities than Told Inactive subjects. Once again the 
manipulation worked: Told Drug subjects reported more cognitive effects in line with 
R273’s response expectancies than Told Inactive subjects, F (1,94) = 45.08, p <. 01, 
•p
2=  .32. Like in Experiments 1 and 2, an interaction between drug instruction and 
cognitive ability ratings shows Told Drug subjects did not report uniformly better 
cognitive abilities, F (5, 90) = 5.45; p < .01, partial •2 = .23 (see Figure 4.2). Follow up t-
tests revealed that Told Drug subjects rated every ability significantly higher than their 
Told Inactive counterparts (all p < .01) except for thinking, t (94) = 1.68, p = .10.  
Subjects’ comments also fit with these empirical findings. For example, subject 
26 wrote “it was easier to focus on a computer screen than normally is.” Similarly, 
subject 20 reported “I felt very awake and aware.”  
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Figure 4.2. Mean score for the manipulation check by drug instruction 
 
PM instructions. When quizzed at the end of the experiment, 100% of subjects 
correctly recalled the PM action (press the Q key) and recalled their specific cue. 
Therefore I concluded that if subjects encountered a cue, but failed to press the Q key, 
it was not because they did not know what their PM cue or task was. 
PM Accuracy 
I now turn to my first primary research question: would a sham memory drug 
improve people’s ability to remember to perform an action in the future? That is, would 
R273 increase subjects’ ability to remember to press the Q key in the presence of a 
particular cue? Recall, I predicted that R273 would improve subjects’ prospective 
memories only in the nonfocal condition—a condition that called for effortful 
monitoring. I predicted that R273 would not improve subjects’ prospective memories in 
the focal condition—a condition that called for automatic and spontaneous retrieval.  
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To answer my first research question I calculated the mean proportion of times 
Told Drug and Told Inactive subjects remembered to press the Q key. I then classified 
these means according to what subjects were told about their substance and whether 
their cue to remember required cognitive effort to detect (nonfocal) or whether their 
cue to remember did not require cognitive effort to detect (focal). These results appear 
in Figure 4.3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3. Mean proportion of correct PM trials 
 
Figure 4.3 shows two key findings. First, comparing the bars on the right side of 
the dotted line with the bars on the left side of the of the dotted line, shows that 
subjects were worse at remembering to press the Q key when they received a nonfocal 
cue that encouraged monitoring, (M = .58, SD = .29) compared to a focal cue that 
encouraged spontaneous retrieval (M = .94, SD = .12). In other words, a main effect for 
Cue, F (1, 92) = 67.89, p < .001, •p
2 = .43, tells us that regardless of whether subjects 
were told they had received the active or inactive version of R273, they were better able 
to remember to perform the PM action when they received a focal cue compared to a 
nonfocal cue.  
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Second, comparing the bars on the left side of the dotted line shows that Told 
Drug and Told Inactive subjects remembered to press the Q key at similar rates in the 
focal condition, t < 1, ns. Yet comparing the bars on the right side of the dotted line 
shows that Told Drug subjects in the nonfocal condition remembered to press the Q 
key more often than their Told Inactive counterparts, t (46) = 2.22, p = .03, Cohen’s d = 
.65. In other words, the interaction between Cue and Drug indicates that a when a PM 
task required effortful monitoring and attention, R273 effectively enhanced subjects’ 
PM, F (1, 92) = 5.15, p = .03, •p
2 = .05.  
These two findings replicate similar results reported by Einstein et al. (2005). 
That is, it is harder to remember PM tasks when ongoing task activity does not call 
direct attention to it. However, people are more likely to remember to perform the PM 
task if they think the task is important. The results of Experiment 3 extend those of 
Einstein et al. by demonstrating that PM performance was increased, not by 
manipulating information about the PM task, but by manipulating information 
regarding subjects’ abilities. Specifically, when people were given a behavioural 
instruction—in the form of a memory placebo—that manipulated their expectations 
about their cognitive abilities, people were more likely to perform the PM task. This 
memory enhancement however was only found in the condition that called for effortful 
monitoring. In a situation that called for effortless and automatic retrieval of the PM 
task, no enhancement was found.  
Yet, while these results tell us about a memory placebo’s ability to increase 
people’s prospective memories, they do not provide direct evidence that subjects used 
more monitoring. In order to answer this question I now turn to examine how the R273 
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drug instruction and type of PM cue influenced subjects’ performance on their ongoing 
task. 
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Objective Measures of Monitoring  
Response time. Did telling subjects they had taken a cognitive enhancing drug lead 
them to use more cognitive effort—monitoring—than subjects who were told they took 
a placebo? If Told Drug subjects use more monitoring than their Told Inactive 
counterparts, there should be a cost to their ongoing task performance. More 
specifically, Told Drug subjects should be slower to categorise word pairs than their 
Told Inactive counterparts.  
To examine whether there was evidence that Told Drug subjects used more 
monitoring than their Told Inactive counterparts I first calculated subjects’ mean 
response times on correctly answered word-pair trials. I then classified subjects’ mean 
response times according to whether their drug condition was active or inactive, 
whether their cue was focal or nonfocal and when they performed the PM or Control 
tasks. These results are displayed in Figure 4.4. The bars on the left side of the dotted 
line indicate how long subjects took to categorise the word-pairs when they were also 
performing a PM task. The bars on the right side of the dotted line indicate subjects’ 
response times for when they were only performing the ongoing task—essentially these 
bars represent baseline performance.  
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Figure 4.4. Mean response time to categorise word-pairs on correctly answered trials. 
 
Figure 4.4 shows three key findings. First, comparing the bars on the left side of 
the dotted line with the bars on the right side of the dotted line shows that subjects 
were slower to categorise words when they also had to remember to perform a PM task. 
In other words, there was a main effect for Task, F (1, 92) = 43.98, p < .001, •p
2 = .32, 
in that subjects’ PM task response times were longer (M = 1462.15, SD = 292.29) than 
Control task response times (M = 1301.25, SD = 225.51), t (95) = 4.99, p < .001,  
Cohen’s d = .51.  
Second, examining the bars on the left side of the graph shows that when 
subjects performed the PM task, they were slower to categorise words with a cue that 
encouraged effortful monitoring than with a cue that encouraged automatic and 
effortless retrieval. However, examining the right side of the graph shows a different 
pattern of results: when subjects performed the Control task, they categorised words at 
a similar rate, regardless of the cue. In other words, I found an interaction between Cue 
Experimental half Control half 
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and Task, F (1,92) = 70.65, p < .001, •p
2 = .43. Follow up t-tests showed that subjects 
categorised words more slowly with a nonfocal cue (M= 1632.52, SD = 277.32), than a 
focal cue (M = 1291.78, SD = 191.04), t (95) = 7.01, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 1.42. There 
was no significant difference between subjects’ categorisation times during the Control 
task, regardless of whether they saw a focal cue (M= 1334.81, SD = 268.92) or nonfocal 
cue (M = 1267.68, SD = 167.84), t (95) = 1.47, p = .15, ns. 
Finally, comparing the bars on the left side of the figure with the bars on the 
right side of the figure shows that when subjects had a PM action to remember, Told 
Drug subjects categorised words more slowly than Told Inactive subjects; when subjects 
were only performing word-categorisation trials, Told Drug subjects categorised words 
at the same speed as Told Inactive subjects. In other words, there was an interaction 
between Task and Drug, F (1, 92) = 4.72, p = .03, •p
2 = .05. Follow up t-tests showed 
that Told Drug subjects (M = 1520.40, SD = 314.50) categorised words more slowly 
than Told Inactive subjects during the PM Task (M = 1403.89, SD = 258.53), t (94) = 
1.98, p = .05, Cohen’s d = .40; however, there was no difference during the Control Task 
(M = 1306.78, SD= 165.17, M = 1295.71, SD = 274.67 respectively), t < 1, ns.  
To further examine the relationship between response time and PM accuracy I 
conducted I conducted two multiple logistic regressions by simultaneously regressing 
PM accuracy and response time on drug condition (told drug or told inactive). In 
multiple logistic regression, each of the regression coefficients is a partial regression 
coefficient; each is interpreted adjusting for the other effects in the model (Cohen, 
Cohen, West & Aiken, 2003). Using this model allows us to examine whether accuracy 
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predicts drug condition while holding response time constant, and whether response 
time predicts drug condition while holding accuracy constant.  
In the focal condition, the overall model was non significant: χ (3) = 3.07, p = 
.38 and accounts for very little variance (R2 = .04). Neither accuracy nor response time 
predicted drug condition. However, in the nonfocal condition, the overall model is 
significant: χ (3) = 12.17, p < .01 and accounts for about 18% of the variance (R2 = 
.18). Additionally, both response time (p = .03) and PM accuracy (p = .04) significantly 
predict drug condition. These results indicate that the association between told 
condition and PM is significant even with response time controlled which would 
suggest that response time partially mediates the effect of drug instruction on accuracy. 
Taken together, these results suggest that Told Drug subjects used more 
monitoring that their Told Inactive counterparts. Told Drug subjects were slower to 
categorise word-pairs when they were also performing a PM task. These results suggest 
that Told Drug subjects were dividing their attention between the ongoing task and the 
PM task. Yet taken in light of Told Drug subject’ accuracy on performing the PM task, 
increased monitoring only affected accuracy in the condition which called for 
monitoring. In sum, this pattern of results is similar to those obtained by Einstein et al. 
(2005).  
Accuracy: Another way to examine whether the R273 drug instruction affected 
subjects’ ongoing task performance is to examine their accuracy at categorising the word 
pairs. To answer this question I calculated the mean proportion of word-pair trials 
subjects answered correctly and classified these means according to what subjects were 
told about their substance, the type of cue they received and whether or not they were 
performing a concurrent PM task. I display these results in Figure 4.5. 
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Figure 4.5. Mean proportion of ongoing trials answered correctly 
 
Subjects’ accuracy on performing the ongoing task was not affected by what 
subjects were told about their substance, nor the type of cue (focal or nonfocal) they 
received. In other words, drug instruction F = (1, 92) = 1.55, p = .23, ns and cue type, F 
(1, 92) = 1.99, p = .16, ns, did not affect subjects’ ability to correctly categorise the word 
pairs. In fact, as shown in the figure, all subjects were good at correctly categorising the 
words—accuracy was close to ceiling. There was a marginally significant trend for 
subjects to be more accurate to categorise the word pairs when the ongoing task was 
their sole task, F (1, 92) = 4.07, p = .05, •p
2 = .04. This result might reflect the notion 
that having subjects engage in two tasks at the same time is harder than engaging in just 
one. Therefore it seems logical that all subjects were marginally less accurate at 
categorising words when also completing the PM task.  
Experimental half Control half 
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In sum the findings on response time and ongoing task accuracy replicate those 
of Einstein et al. (2005). Specifically, the finding that Told Drug subjects were slower to 
perform the ongoing categorisation trials when they were also performing a PM task 
suggests that Told Drug subjects used more monitoring than Told Inactive subjects, 
especially in the nonfocal PM condition. This finding extends the literature on the 
multiple-processes framework by providing evidence that people can be led to use more 
effortful monitoring by manipulating their expectancies about their cognitive abilities, as 
opposed to manipulating their expectancies about the task (e.g. task importance; 
Einstein et al., 2005).  
Subjective Measures of Monitoring  
Finally, I examine whether there was any subjective evidence that Told Drug 
and Told Inactive subjects differed in their perceptions of the PM task and the word-
categorisation task. To examine this question I calculated subjects’ mean ratings of task 
importance for both the word categorisation and PM tasks. I then classified these means 
according whether subjects were in the Told Drug or Told Inactive condition and 
whether their cue was focal or nonfocal. I display these means in Figure 4.6. 
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Figure 4.6. Mean ratings of importance of the ongoing and PM tasks by drug condition 
 
As the figure shows, Told Drug subjects rated both the ongoing task and the 
PM task as more important than the Told Inactive subjects. In other words, a main 
effect for Drug, F (1, 92) = 6.21, p = .01, •p
2 = .07, suggests that what subjects were 
told about their drug resulted in altered perceptions of task importance.  
These results provide evidence as to why Told Drug subjects used more 
monitoring compared to their Told Inactive counterparts. Even though subjects were 
not given information about the importance of their tasks, this pattern of results 
suggests that response expectancies about R273 might have been reflected onto the 
tasks they were performing. As a consequence, Told Drug subjects might have been 
more motivated than Told Inactive subjects to perform their tasks accurately. 
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Summary 
In sum, the pattern of results obtained in Experiment 3 show that a placebo can 
improve people’s prospective memories. Specifically, Told Drug subjects were better at 
remembering to perform a PM task when that task demanded they use effortful and 
deliberate retrieval strategies, but were slower to perform their ongoing task. As a 
whole, this pattern of results suggests that Told Drug subjects used more cognitive 
effort in order to effectively recall the PM action. Consequently, it is likely that some of 
the cognitive resources they would usually have allocated to the ongoing task were 
instead allocated to remembering the PM task.  
These results converge with the findings of Einstein et al. (2005) who found that 
subjects who thought the PM task was important had better PM, but were slower to 
categorise word-pairs. The results of Experiment 3, however, extend the previous 
research of Einstein et al. (2005). Specifically, while Einstein et al. improved people’s 
prospective memories by manipulating the characteristics of the PM task, the results of 
Experiment 3 suggest that PM can be improved simply by manipulating people’s 
perceptions of their own cognitive abilities. In this study, people simply ingested a small 
amount of Vitamin C powder that they were led to believe was a cognitive enhancing 
drug. Consequently, subjects’ prospective memories were improved. 
The results of Experiment 3 converge with those of Experiments 1 and 2, 
suggesting that R273 “works” because it leads people to switch from their usual easy 
and effortless cognitive behaviours to deliberate and effortful cognitive behaviours. 
Considered as a whole, these results have theoretical implications. Specifically, they 
provide some evidence that the same underlying processes that caused subjects to 
switch from their usual and effortless source monitoring, also caused them to switch 
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from their automatic and effortless strategies for PM retrieval. Secondly they build on 
the cognitive-enhancing placebo literature by showing that a memory placebo can affect 
people’s memories in another memory paradigm—not just susceptibility to false 
memories. 
Practically, the results of Experiment 3 highlight the role that people’s 
expectancies play in shaping their behaviours—even those behaviours that may be 
typically thought of as cognitive—and also highlight the importance of taking these 
expectancies into account when examining the effectiveness of cognitive enhancing 
drugs. Specifically, while there are no drugs currently available to eyewitnesses 
enhancing their memories (as in Experiments 1 and 2), there are a host of drugs on the 
market that claim to sharpen thinking, increase focus and mental clarity, and improve 
memory. What is more, recent research reports the growing use and acceptance of these 
drugs (Chattergee, 2004; Maher, 2008). Future research might address the effectiveness 
of these so called “smart” drugs and investigate whether they work because of the 
physiological properties contained in the drug or because people have the desire, 
expectation and need for them to work.
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Chapter 5 
General Discussion 
The overarching goal of this thesis was to establish whether a placebo could lead 
people to engage in more effortful monitoring, thereby improving their performance on 
retrospective and prospective memory tasks. To achieve this goal I first examined the 
evidence that a memory placebo improved effortful source monitoring in a 
misinformation effect experiment, thus decreasing people's susceptibility to memory 
distortion. Next, I examined the evidence that a memory placebo improved effortful 
monitoring in a prospective memory task, thus increasing people's prospective 
memories.  
Overview of Experiments and Key findings  
In Experiment 1 (Chapter 2) I aimed to find empirical support for the 
hypothesis that R273 reduces the misinformation effect because subjects switch from 
their usually automatic and easy source monitoring to more deliberate and effortful 
source monitoring. I also aimed to establish whether certain subjects—namely, those 
with higher WMC—might respond differently to R273. To answer my research 
questions I ran subjects through a sham drug experiment, and then had them take part 
in a standard misinformation effect experiment. I also surreptitiously measured subjects 
reading speeds of the PEI and their response times on the memory test. The pattern of 
results in Experiment 1 suggested that R273 did not affect effortful source monitoring 
during the PEI but did affect effortful source monitoring during the memory test. I also 
found individual differences in people's responsiveness to R273. Specifically, people 
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with higher WMC who were told they had taken the sham drug were less misled than 
their higher WMC counterparts who were told they had received the inactive placebo.  
My goals in Experiment 2 (Chapter 3) were to align my methods more closely 
with the literature on postwarnings and the misinformation effect, and find evidence, 
which converged with the results of Experiment 1. Specifically, I examined whether the 
R273 placebo effect occurs because of subjects’ source monitoring during the memory 
test. To do so, I ran subjects through the basic R273 and misinformation effect 
experiment but informed subjects of their “true” drug condition immediately before the 
memory test. The primary finding of Experiment 2 added further support to the idea 
that R273 affects subjects’ decision processes: Told Drug subjects were less misled than 
their Told Inactive counterparts.  
Finally, in Experiment 3 (Chapter 4) I examined whether the underlying 
monitoring processes that people use to perform prospective memory tasks were similar 
to the source monitoring processes that they use for retrospective memory tasks. To do 
so, I combined the R273 drug administration procedure with a prospective memory 
task. The results suggested that R273 increased subjects’ effortful monitoring. As a 
consequence Told Drug subjects' prospective memories were more accurate than Told 
Inactive subjects on certain prospective memory tasks.  
In summary, the results of this series of experiments suggest that the sham 
cognitive enhancing placebo R273 both improved people’s ability to resist misleading 
suggestion, and to perform prospective memory tasks because it led them to use more 
effortful monitoring.  
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The Source Monitoring Framework  
Considered as a whole, the results in this thesis are consistent with literature on 
the SMF; people either rely on automatic or effortful processes in order to monitor the 
sources of their memories, and these processes can affect the accuracy of people's 
source attributions (Johnson et al., 1993; Mitchell & Johnson, 2000). As previously 
discussed throughout this thesis, in the misinformation effect, people who use more 
effortful and deliberate monitoring tend to be less susceptible to the effects of 
misleading suggestion (Echterhoff et al., 2005; Zaragoza & Koshmeider, 1989; Lindsay 
& Johnson, 1989).  
My results lend direct support to this idea. First, subjects in Experiment 1 were 
slower to respond to misled test items, and more accurate than Told Inactive subjects. 
This finding suggests that Told Drug subjects used more effortful and deliberate source 
monitoring than their Told Inactive counterparts. The results of Experiment 2 also fit 
with the idea that R273 affected Told Drug subjects' source monitoring during the test, 
even though there was no explicit evidence in the form of response time differences 
between Told Drug and Told Inactive subjects. Because the drug instruction was 
administered immediately before the memory test, source monitoring behaviours could 
not, and should not, have been different between Told Drug and Told Inactive subjects 
during either the event or the PEI. It thus seems logical to conclude that decision 
processes are the only aspect of source monitoring that were affected by the R273 drug 
instruction in Experiment 2.  
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While the pattern of results obtained in this thesis fit with the SMF, they also 
resonate with several other literatures highlighting the important dichotomy between 
automatic and controlled cognitive processes, and their effects on behaviour.  
Automatic vs. Controlled Behaviour 
Automaticity  
Literature in both the cognitive and social psychological domains suggests that 
the majority of our behaviours occur automatically, without conscious and deliberate 
effort or thought (see Bargh & Chartrand, 1999 for a review). In fact, years of research 
suggest that although we may not be aware, our environments, and cues received from 
these environments, shape and influence our behaviour (Schwarz & Clore, 1983). For 
example, Williams and Bargh (in press) demonstrated that when people had recently 
experienced physical warmth or coldness—induced by having them hold a hot or iced 
cup of coffee—they were more likely to make interpersonal judgements about people 
that were congruent with the temperature of the beverage they had held. Subjects who 
held the warm coffee were likely to judge a target person as warm; subjects who held 
the ice-cold coffee were likely to judge a target person as cold. Broadly, Williams and 
Bargh's results suggest that behaviours can occur automatically. More specifically, their 
results lend weight to the idea that without people's awareness, a physical cue in the 
environment can influence a future behaviour without people being aware of the 
influence occurring.  
Similarly, myriad studies show that experiences we have in one context can lead 
us to adopt a mindset that influences our behaviour in another context. In a study by 
Wilson and Capitman (1982), male subjects in the experimental condition read a classic 
"boy meets girl" story. Male subjects in the control condition read a neutral story about 
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the Mississippi River. Next, in a supposedly unrelated experiment about problem 
solving, “boy meets girl” subjects were friendlier to a female confederate than the 
“river” subjects. That is, “boy meets girl” subjects smiled more, talked more, gazed 
more, and had more open body language than their “river” story counterparts. Wilson 
and Capitman reasoned that when “boy meets girl” subjects read the story, it activated a 
“boy meets girl” script, which in turn directed and influenced subjects’ behaviour. 
Wilson and Capitman’s results converge with those of Williams and Bargh (in press) by 
suggesting that certain contexts or cues encountered in the environment can instigate 
and offset behaviours, even though people are unaware of this influence occurring. 
How do these findings inform the results of this thesis?  
Across the three R273 studies Told Drug subjects rated themselves as 
experiencing more enhancement of their senses, a greater ability to concentrate, a 
quickening of their responses and an improvement of their memories even though they 
took the same inactive substance as the Told Inactive subjects. Perhaps then, 
information about R273 conveyed by the video and experimenter, coupled with the 
drug instruction, triggered a “cognitive enhancement” script in Told Drug subjects. For 
example, Wilson and Capitman’s (1982) results suggest that when subjects activated a 
“boy meets girl” script, they unconsciously altered their behaviours to act in line with 
this script. Subjects in Experiments 1 to 3 of this thesis might have activated a 
“cognitive enhancement” script, leading them to unconsciously adopt behaviours 
consistent with the response expectancies provided to them about R273. Consequently, 
the activation of the “cognitive enhancement” script might have set in motion a chain 
of behaviours, which lead Told Drug subjects to “experience” more of R273’s effects 
than Told Inactive subjects (Kirsch, 1997). Yet if Told Drug subjects’ behaviours were 
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driven by unconscious and automatic response expectancies, how would this lead to 
them use more controlled and effortful monitoring during the memory tasks? 
While many behaviours may be initiated automatically, the activation of these 
behaviours can sometimes lead people to then use more controlled and effortful 
cognitive processes in order to achieve their goals (Hassin, Bargh & Zimmerman, in 
press). For example, Hassin et al. primed people to activate an “achievement” goal by 
presenting them with lists of words that were related to achievement concepts such as 
win, compete, strive, attain, master and achieve, etc. In the non-primed condition subjects read 
neutral words such as ranch, carpet, river, hat, etc. Subjects then completed the Wisconsin 
Card Sorting Task (a neuropsychological task where subjects match up pairs of cards 
though they are not informed of a how they should match the cards; experiment 1) or 
the Iowa Gambling Task (a decision making task; experiment 2). Hassin et al. found 
that when primed for achievement, subjects completed the tasks more accurately. More 
broadly, the results suggest that by simply activating concepts all linked to a particular 
goal or outcome, people can automatically activate and initiate that goal, even though as 
a consequence, they use more controlled and effortful cognitive processes.  
Likewise, my data are congruent with the idea that an automatic response can 
unconsciously offset a controlled process. For example, if the Told Drug instruction led 
Told Drug subjects to activate a “cognitive enhancement” script, they may have also 
activated a “cognitive enhancement” goal. Consequently, Told Drug subjects might 
have unconsciously acted in ways consistent with the activated behavioural script 
activated, which then lead them to use more careful and effortful monitoring. Similarly, 
if the Told Inactive instruction did not lead Told Inactive subjects to activate a 
“cognitive enhancement” goal, they should have had no reason to change their 
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behaviours. Indeed, evidence obtained in this thesis suggests that Told Drug subjects 
used more effortful monitoring than Told Inactive subjects. Specifically, Told Drug 
subjects responded more slowly on the memory test in Experiment 1, and took longer 
to categorise the word pairs in Experiment 3, thus improving their prospective 
memories.  
Considered as a whole, I found a pattern of results that resonate with the 
psychological literature on automaticity. While many behaviours occur automatically, 
shaped and offset by cues in the environment, automatic processes can also lead people 
to engage in more controlled and effortful processing. However, the results of this 
thesis also resonate with literature on hypnosis, which is itself closely tied to 
automaticity. 
Hypnosis  
Literature on hypnosis informs the results of this thesis in two ways. First, just 
as there is no particular ingredient that makes a placebo work other than the subject’s 
expectancies, there is no particular hypnotic procedure that induces a hypnotic state. 
For instance, Kirsch and Lynn (1999) draw parallels between hypnosis and placebo 
effects, noting that “a hypnotic induction is like a placebo in that its effects do not 
depend on the specific ingredients (e.g., instructions to relax) but rather on people’s 
beliefs about those ingredients” (p. 507). Indeed, as early as the 1960’s research 
suggested that a hypnotic procedure was not needed in order generate behaviours that 
are typically demonstrated under hypnosis. Barber (1969) showed that hypnotic states 
such as sleepiness or deep relaxation could be induced by suggestion alone, without the 
formal protocols used by hypnotists. This idea supports the notion that R273 lead Told 
Drug subjects to experience more of the drug's effects because subjects were lead to 
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expect those effects. More specifically, across three experiments, in which all subjects 
received exactly the same inactive substance, Told Drug subjects rated their subjective 
experience of R273 as being higher than that of the Told Inactive subjects.  
The second way the literature on hypnosis informs my results is that hypnotic 
suggestion can lead people to override their habitual and usual automatic processes. 
Take, for example, the Stoop effect (1935). In a Stroop effect experiment subjects see 
words in coloured ink that also spell the word of a colour. The colour the word spells 
and the colour of the ink are either congruent (see Figure 5.1A; e.g. the word is 
presented in the colour red and spells the word “RED”) or incongruent (see Figure 
5.1B; e.g. the word is presented in the colour red and spells the word “GREEN”). 
Subjects’ task is to ignore the colour that the word spells and only name the ink that the 
word is printed in. When the words and colours are congruent the task is easy to 
complete; when the words and colours are incongruent the task is difficult to complete. 
The Stroop effect taps into automatic processes because for a proficient reader, reading 
the words is automatic and cannot be withheld without using deliberate and conscious 
effort.  
RED 
 
GREEN 
 
Figure 5.1. Illustration of the Stroop task. Box A shows a congruent trial—the word and colour 
correspond. Box B shows an incongruent trial—the word and colour do not correspond. 
 
Research suggests that hypnotic suggestion can induce people to override their 
automatic tendency to name the colour that the word spells (Raz, Shaprio, Fan, & 
Posner, 2002; Raz, Fan & Posner, 2005, Raz, Moreno-Iniguez, Martin, & Zhu, 2007). In 
one study, Raz et al., (2007) recruited a group of highly hypnotizable and suggestible, 
A. 
Congruent Trial 
B. 
Incongruent Trial 
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but proficient, readers and ran them through a Stroop task. Before the Stoop task 
began, some subjects took part in a hypnotic induction whereby they were told that 
when the experimenter clapped [his or her] hands, symbols would appear on the screen 
that would seem like characters from a foreign language. In the no-suggestion 
condition, subjects were simply given standard instructions to respond quickly and 
name the ink colour of the word.  
Raz et al. (2007) found the hypnotic suggestion did not affect subjects’ reaction 
times on the congruent trials (where word colour and ink colour matched). However, 
hypnotic suggestion did affect subjects’ reaction times on the incongruent trials (where 
word colour and ink colour did not match). Hypnotised subjects were faster to name 
the colour of the word than were non-hypnotised subjects, and made fewer errors. 
Thus, the results of the current thesis converge with the idea that using expectancy and 
suggestion can lead people to override their automatic and habitual ways of responding. 
Suggestion led people to override their automatic responses in a Stroop effect. In this 
thesis, suggestion lead people to override their automatic processes in a misinformation 
effect experiment, and prospective memory experiment. 
To further examine the idea that the R273 placebo "works" because it overrides 
automatic processes, future research could examine R273’s effectiveness in leading 
people to resist the Stroop effect. If subjects use the drug suggestion to override their 
automatic processes, R273 might lead people to use more controlled and effortful 
processing, and decrease Stroop errors.  
Working Memory  
Finally, the results of Experiment 1 showed that WMC was associated with 
subjects’ resistance to misleading suggestion in the Told Drug condition, but not in the 
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Told Inactive condition. This finding fits with literature suggesting that when given a 
reason to do so, people with higher WMC can direct and control their cognitive 
processes, resulting in greater resistance to false memories (Watson et al., 2005). More 
broadly, the WMC findings in Experiment 1 resonate with literature highlighting the 
important role that WMC plays in relation to the use of automatic and controlled 
processes.  
For instance, just as suggestion has been shown to override people's automatic 
processes in the Stroop effect, so too have WMC differences. In a series of five 
experiments, Kane and Engle (2003) measured subjects’ OSPAN and then ran them 
through the Stroop task. Critically, Kane and Engle manipulated the number of 
congruent and incongruent trials in each test. In one condition there were no congruent 
trials (low congruent condition), and subjects had to continually keep the Stroop task in 
mind. In the other condition, 75-80% of the trials were congruent (high congruent 
condition), meaning that subjects should have responded in a habitual and automatic 
fashion, forgetting to name the colour on the incongruent trials. Kane and Engle 
reasoned that it should be harder for lower spans to correctly name the colour of the 
word in the high congruent condition; the trials would not encourage subjects to keep 
the task in mind. However, higher spans, who are better at maintaining their attention in 
cognitively demanding situations, should be better able to switch back and fourth from 
completing congruent and incongruent trials. In both conditions, lower spans made 
more errors compared to higher spans. However, the number of errors that subjects 
made varied with the number of congruent and incongruent trials. When the task was 
made of primarily congruent trials—trials that promote the responding on a habitual 
and fast manner—lower spans made more errors than higher spans. This finding 
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suggests that higher spans were better able to break their response habit and keep the 
goal of the experiment in mind. Put another way, higher spans possessed an advantage 
in a context demanding effortful control.  
Future research could further examine the relationship between R273 and 
WMC. One means of examining this issue would be to look at R273 and WMC using 
the prospective memory paradigm from Experiment 3. For example, literature suggests 
that WM is related to prospective memory performance. In one study, Marsh & Hicks 
(1998) gave subjects an event-based prospective memory task (similar to the PM ask in 
Experiment 3; when “X” occurs do “Y”) but varied the amount of cognitive load that 
the ongoing task required. They reasoned that overloading working memory would 
drain cognitive resources available for remembering the PM task. Indeed, Marsh and 
Hicks found that when subjects performed the PM task under high cognitive load, 
subjects were worse at remembering to perform the PM task. Under low load there was 
no difference. Thus, with research linking WM to prospective memory, and research 
linking WM to R273, the next step would be to examine whether R273's effectiveness 
during the prospective memory task is related to subjects' WMC.  
Recall that R273 improved prospective remembering only in a task that required 
effortful control. R273 did not affect prospective remembering in a task that relied on 
automatic processes. These results suggest several hypotheses for future research. On 
the one hand, it seems unlikely that there would be a relationship between WMC and 
R273 in a prospective memory task that is prompted by an easily detectable focal cue; 
higher span WMC people tend to only show an attentional advantage on tasks that are 
difficult and require control (Kane et al., 2007). On the other hand, if the R273 drug 
instruction acts in a similar fashion to a warning, higher WMC subjects who receive 
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R273 might use more monitoring than their higher WMC counterparts who receive the 
placebo. If so, Told Drug subjects with higher WMC might have better prospective 
memory than Told Inactive subjects with higher WMC. In addition, because WM is 
related to prospective memory, higher WM subjects might perform more accurately on 
a prospective memory task than their lower WM counterparts, regardless of drug 
condition. If such results were obtained, they would provide further insight into the 
relationship between R273 and WMC, and extend the growing body of literature 
showing that people with high WMC are better at focusing on a task than low WMC 
people, especially when the task is hard, or when prompted to do so (Kane et al., 2007; 
Watson et al., 2005).  
Counter Explanations  
Although my data suggest that the R273 memory placebo lead people to 
experience subjective effects associated with R273, increased people's resistance to 
misleading information, and improved their prospective memories because of their 
response expectancies, there are alternative explanations for these results.  
Subjective Effects. Although Told Drug subjects rated themselves as experiencing 
significantly more of R273's effects than Told Inactive subjects, maybe these ratings 
reflected Told Drug subjects simply going through a thought process of "You told me I 
took a drug that enhances my cognitive abilities. I guess you want me to say that I 
experienced these effects." However, if Told Drug subjects were simply responding in 
an appeasing manner it is equally likely that others would have responded in a way that 
countered the R273 effect. Specifically, some other subjects might think, "You told me I 
took a drug that enhances my cognitive abilities. I guess you want me to say that I 
experienced these effects. Why should I do that?"  
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In addition, subjects’ reactions to the debriefing in Experiment 2 suggested that 
some subjects genuinely believed the manipulation. Some subjects, for example, 
appeared unsurprised when they were told they had received the active drug instead of 
the inactive placebo, saying things like “I thought I’d taken the real thing,” or “I knew 
it!” Similarly, subjects’ comments across the three studies show that many were willing 
to go just beyond the ratings and elaborate on the ways in which they had “felt” the 
bogus drug. In short, there is little evidence to support the counter-explanation that 
wanting to appease the experimenter drove subjects' responses to R273  
Objective Effects. An alternative explanation also exists as to why Told Drug 
subjects performed more accurately on the memory tests of Experiments 1 to 3. Maybe 
Told Drug subjects were simply more motivated than Told Inactive subjects to perform 
well. Recall, the results of Experiment 3 suggested that Told Drug subjects thought 
both their ongoing and prospective memory tasks were more important than Told 
Inactive subjects. Perhaps then, the R273 placebo effect is simply caused by motivation. 
However, if R273 increased resistance to misleading suggestion simply because Told 
Drug subjects were more motivated to do well, I should have also found that Told Drug 
subjects exerted more effort during the event and the PEI. Specifically, if Told Drug 
subjects exerted more effort during the event, or rehearsed the event more, they should 
have demonstrated better performance than Told Inactive subjects on control items. In 
addition, I might expect that if Told Drug subjects were motivated to do well they may 
have also exerted more effort during the PEI, which should have been evidenced by 
longer reading times of the PEI. However, I found no evidence to indicate that Told 
Drug subjects exerted more effort during the event—Told Drug and Told Inactive 
subjects performed equally well on control items. Nor did I find evidence to suggest 
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Told Drug subjects exerted more effort during the PEI—reading speeds of the PEI 
were no different between Told Drug and Told Inactive subjects. In short, there is little 
support for the counter explanation that Told Drug subjects were more motivated than 
Told Inactive subjects.  
Implications  
The SMF  
The source monitoring literature has established that people's expectancies can 
be helpful or harmful to source monitoring, and consequently, to memory. For example 
in one study, Sherman and Bessenoff (1999) examined how expectations, in the form of 
stereotypes, influence people's ability to use effective source monitoring. They had 
subjects read lists of friendly and unfriendly behaviours. One list of behaviours was 
attributed to either a priest or a skinhead; the other list was attributed to the 
experimenter. The next day subjects saw the old lists and a new list and were asked to 
make source attributions about whether the behaviours were old or new, and if they 
were old, who had performed them. The experimenters also attempted to reduce the 
likelihood that subjects would engage in effortful and deliberate source monitoring by 
having some subjects complete a divided attention task at the same time as making the 
source attributions. Subjects who had the divided attention task made more stereotyped 
source confusions, suggesting that when they were unable to divide full attention to 
their decision processes, they used stereotypes to guide their source attributions. 
Specifically subjects misattributed more unfriendly behaviours to the skinhead and 
misattributed more friendly behaviours to the priest.  
However, research suggests that people's expectations about other people might 
also influence source monitoring in misinformation effect experiments: when people 
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expect that the source is untrustworthy, unreliable, and not credible, they are more likely 
to engage in effortful and deliberate source monitoring which leads them to be less 
susceptible to the effects of misleading suggestion (Dodd & Bradshaw, 1980; 
Echterhoff et al., 2005).  
Taken together, these two lines of research suggest that people's expectancies 
about people affect how they will monitor information both about, and from, those 
people. My results extend this body of literature by suggesting that people's expectancies 
about themselves also influence how they monitor information. Specifically, subjects in 
Experiments 1 and 2 never received information about the credibility of the PEI, and 
subjects should have had little reason to think that details from the event and PEI might 
be different. Thus my results suggest that manipulating people's expectancies about 
their own abilities lead them to use more effortful source monitoring.  
The Placebo Effect  
My results extend the literature on placebo effects and memory in two ways. 
First, the results suggest a potential mechanism by which the R273 placebo affected 
subjects’ behaviours, which lead to more accurate memory performance. Across three 
experiments I found patterns of results suggesting that people used their expectations 
about the placebo to override their habitual and automatic cognitive behaviours, and 
thus engaged in more effortful and controlled monitoring.  
Second, my results extend the literature on placebos and memory by 
demonstrating that susceptibility to memory distortion is only one aspect of memory 
that a placebo can affect. I found that a placebo could affect people's prospective 
memories using an event-based prospective memory task. In light of these results, 
future research may look at using other cognitive-based paradigms in which people can 
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better their performance depending on whether they use automatic or controlled 
cognitive processes. As has already been mentioned, the Stroop effect may be one 
potential paradigm whereby R273 might lead people override their habitual and 
automatic cognitive processes.  
Cognitive Enhancing Drugs  
My results have implications for the important and timely social issue of 
society’s growing use and acceptance of cognitive enhancing drugs. For example, 5-15% 
of American college students routinely use drugs such a modafinil and methylphenidate, 
which were originally developed to treat Attention Deficit Disorder and narcolepsy 
(Nature, 2007). In addition, a recent survey of 1400 people conducted by Nature found 
that 1 in 5 people reported using cognitive enhancing drugs to increase their focus, 
attention, concentration and memory (Maher, 2008).  
However my results suggest that people might not need to take actual cognitive 
enhancing drugs in order to experience the effects of those drugs. Indeed, examining 
subjects' ratings on the manipulation checks across three experiments, as well as 
subjects' comments, suggests that when people were told that R273 would increase their 
attention, focus and ability to concentrate, people thought it did. In addition, people 
reported experiencing these cognitive effects after one supposedly small dose of a 
"drug" that they had no previous exposure to, or experience with.  
In light of the powerful effect that expectancies can have on people's behaviour, 
future research might examine whether expectancies about cognitive enhancing drugs 
affect people's subjective and objective experience of those drugs. There are many ways 
in which this issue could be examined. One way is to recruit people who believe that 
cognitive enhancing drugs are effective and ask them to take R273 every day for a set 
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number of weeks. If expectancies play a key role in eliciting people’s responses to 
cognitive enhancing drugs, we may find that people’s subjective responses to R273 grow 
stronger. That is, people’s expectations of cognitive enhancement may consistently 
create effects congruent with cognitive enhancement. Consequently, the creation of 
these subjective effects may then feedback into fuelling and maintaining their 
expectations. Such a finding would be congruent with Kirsch’s  (1985; 1997) account of 
response expectancies. On the other hand, we may find that because R273 is simply just 
a placebo, people will come to realise that the “drug” does nothing. In this case the 
subjective effects may become subject to extinction.  
 The second way of examining expectancies and cognitive enhancing drugs is to 
recruit groups of people who regularly endorse and use cognitive enhancing drugs, and 
people who do not endorse or use cognitive enhancing drugs. Then, running people 
through the R273 memory paradigms might demonstrate that cognitive enhancing drug 
users—people who are likely to believe that cognitive enhancing drugs work—are more 
susceptible to R273's effects than non users.  
Finally, a full balanced placebo design could be used with actual cognitive 
enhancing drugs. This design would enable the components of actual cognitive 
enhancing drugs that cause subjective and behavioural changes to be isolated into those 
that are caused by active ingredients, and those that are caused by desire and 
expectancy.  
Eyewitness Memory  
A report released by the Innocence Project (2008) states that in the USA alone, 
since 1989, over 200 people have been exonerated of committing crimes that they did 
not commit. Mistaken eyewitness testimony played a leading role in over 75% of these 
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convictions. Taken in light of this report, and the fact that it is well established that 
incorrect suggestions and information given to people after they have witnessed a crime 
can damage their memories (Loftus et al., 1978, Loftus, 1991), my results show that in 
certain situations PEI will not always disrupt and damage people's original memories. In 
fact, my results suggest that by manipulating people's expectancies about their cognitive 
abilities, they were motivated to resist this erroneous suggestion by using more effortful 
and careful source monitoring.  
While the cognitive technology does not yet exist whereby witnesses can take 
drugs that improve their memory, this may be a scenario that society faces in the future. 
For example, a significant amount of research conducted by the Defence Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (a military research institution in the USA) investigates the 
effects of pharmaceuticals on cognition (George, 2003). Chatterjee (2004) predicts that 
some of this research will have flow-on effects to regular civilians. As it stands currently, 
smart drugs are used to improve functioning in students, academics, pilots, and military 
personal. Thus, it may only be a matter of time before we are faced with the possibility 
that smart drugs might be made available to eyewitnesses.  
However, even in the absence of actual cognitive enhancing drugs for 
eyewitnesses, my results suggest that although in the real world we rarely have the 
luxury of knowing when witnesses are providing correct or incorrect information, it is 
vital that witnesses are led to be as accurate as possible. Indeed, my results, and those 
obtained in the postwarning literature suggest that even when people have been 
exposed to false information, that information will not necessarily damage or change a 
memory.  
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Conclusions  
In summary, my findings provide evidence suggesting that when people are told 
they have taken a cognitive enhancing drug, they set in motion a chain of response 
expectancies which results in them using more controlled and effortful monitoring. 
These behaviours have important consequences on people’s ability to resist the effects 
of misleading suggestion, as well as their ability to remember to perform tasks in the 
future. In situations where memory accuracy is important—such as recalling details 
about a crime that one was a witness to, or in situations where people have difficult 
tasks to remember to perform—people can increase their chance of accurate 
remembering if they expect that they have the ability to do so. From a more practical 
perspective, the research in this thesis implicates the role of cognitive control in some 
memory failures, and suggests that in some cases these failures can be corrected.  
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Appendix A: Sample Misinformation Narrative  
 
One sunny day after a long day of school, Jim Davis, an average looking guy with 
light brown hair, good build, wearing jeans and a short-sleeved T-shirt decided to visit his 
campus bookstore.  Although there were several things he needed, he had accidentally left 
his wallet at home and wasn't interested in coming back at a later time with his wallet. 
After entering the bookstore, Jim started down an aisle and looked around a bit.  He 
was eventually attracted by a table full of colorful candles.  Jim bent down to inspect them.  
He picked up a white candle which caught his eye and thinking that it might be one of those 
scented ones, smelled it.  But finding that the candle was odorless, Jim put it back down and 
continued on his way.  Feeling a little hungry, Jim nervously snuck a Snickers candy bar into 
his backpack.  He looked at a Michael Jackson album, and then down several aisles Jim went, 
quickly glancing at school supplies and many other things.  As he browsed his way down one 
particular walkway, Jim happened to partially step on a notebook while passing it.  As he 
moved through the supply department, Jim remembered that he needed some glue for a 
project he was working on.  Soon he found a shelf displaying various types of glue next to a 
blue stapler.  He stopped for a moment, touching a bottle of Elmer's glue.  He then looked 
up and noticed someone else in the aisle and decided against stealing it.  He retreated to 
from the aisle to the battery display, and stuck a package of Duracell batteries into the right 
hip pocket of his jeans. 
Feeling comfortable about his previous pilferage, Jim went looking for something 
new to steal when he saw a book that he needed for a class and carefully inspected it.  
Because of its bulk, Jim decided against stealing the book.  It suddenly dawned on him that 
he needed a tie for a dance that was coming up at the end of the week.  Since the tie section 
was secluded, Jim thought, "What the hell" and, after checking carefully, shoved a tie into his 
pack.  To cover his tracks, Jim walked past a Minnie Mouse sweatshirt on the wall, on his 
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way to the Levi's section.  He spent quite a while there and went on to inspect many 
sweaters and vests. 
While looking, Jim bumped into his good friend, Doris Everett, a petite young 
woman.  They hugged and looked at each other warmly.  They then moved on to the 
magazine section.  After wandering around the section, she settled on a magazine which she 
took off the shelf.  Jim followed Doris to some chairs. They sat and looked through it for a 
few minutes and enjoyed the models' contrived poses.  Doris suddenly realized she had to 
leave for work.  Jim walked her down the aisle and they hugged again.  Doris left. 
 Alone again, Jim strolled past a closed elevator door, and into the linen section.  Jim 
thoroughly surveyed the section and then examined a towel, while looking for security 
guards who might have been waiting for his next move.  Upon finding no sign of any such 
watchman, Jim strolled quickly out of the store, untouched.  
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Appendix B: Recognition Test Questions 
 
You will now be asked some questions about the slide sequence you saw. We are testing 
your memory for these slides. 
 
Each question has two parts: 
[1] the first part asks you about a particular item from the slides; 
[2] the second part asks you how confident you are about your answer. 
 
Here is a sample question.  
 
 
Jim was shopping at ________________ 
 
a. The UW 
bookstore 
b. Nordstrom 
 
 
Not confident 
at all
Very 
confident
1                 2                  3                  4                  5
How confident are you that your answer is correct?
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1. The candy bar that Jim stole was a __________ bar 
 
a. Snickers b. Butterfinger 
 
Not confident 
at all
Very 
confident
1                 2                  3                  4                  5
How confident are you that your answer is correct?
 
 
 
2. Jim was wearing _________________ 
 
a. tennis shoes 
(sneakers) 
b. cowboy boots 
 
Not confident 
at all
Very 
confident
1                 2                  3                  4                  5
How confident are you that your answer is correct?
 
 
 
 
3. The color of the candle that Jim smelled was ____________. 
 
a. white b. yellow 
 
Not confident 
at all
Very 
confident
1                 2                  3                  4                  5
How confident are you that your answer is correct?
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4. Jim looked at a _________ album 
 
a. Prince b. Michael Jackson 
 
Not confident 
at all
Very 
confident
1                 2                  3                  4                  5
How confident are you that your answer is correct?
 
 
5. Doris was wearing __________________ 
 
a. slacks b. a skirt 
 
Not confident 
at all
Very 
confident
1                 2                  3                  4                  5
How confident are you that your answer is correct?
 
 
6. The color of the notebook that Jim stepped on was _______________. 
 
a. yellow b. green 
 
Not confident 
at all
Very 
confident
1                 2                  3                  4                  5
How confident are you that your answer is correct?
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7. Jim and Doris seemed to be  ____________________ 
 
a. close friends  b. acquaintances 
 
Not confident 
at all
Very 
confident
1                 2                  3                  4                  5
How confident are you that your answer is correct?
 
 
 
8. The color of the stapler next to the Elmer’s glue was ____________. 
 
a. red b. blue 
 
Not confident 
at all
Very 
confident
1                 2                  3                  4                  5
How confident are you that your answer is correct?
 
 
 
9. Jim put a package of ______________ batteries in his back hip pocket. 
 
a. Duracell b. Everready 
 
Not confident 
at all
Very 
confident
1                 2                  3                  4                  5
How confident are you that your answer is correct?
151 
 
10. In some slides, Doris was wearing a ____________. 
 
a. scarf b. hat 
 
Not confident 
at all
Very 
confident
1                 2                  3                  4                  5
How confident are you that your answer is correct?
 
 
 
11. The textbook that Jim inspected was a _________________. 
 
a. chemistry book b. computer book 
 
Not confident 
at all
Very 
confident
1                 2                  3                  4                  5
How confident are you that your answer is correct?
 
 
 
12. Jim was carrying a ______________. 
 
a. briefcase b. backpack 
 
Not confident 
at all
Very 
confident
1                 2                  3                  4                  5
How confident are you that your answer is correct?
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13. The sweatshirt that Jim walked by had _____________ on the front. 
 
a. Minnie Mouse b. Mickey Mouse 
 
Not confident 
at all
Very 
confident
1                 2                  3                  4                  5
How confident are you that your answer is correct?
 
 
 
14. When Jim left the store it was ____________ time outside 
 
a. daytime b. nighttime 
 
Not confident 
at all
Very 
confident
1                 2                  3                  4                  5
How confident are you that your answer is correct?
 
 
15. The magazine that Doris and Jim looked at was ______________. 
 
a. Vogue magazine b. GQ magazine 
 
Not confident 
at all
Very 
confident
1                 2                  3                  4                  5
How confident are you that your answer is correct?
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16. What kind of hairdo did Doris have? 
 
a. ordinary b. punk 
 
Not confident 
at all
Very 
confident
1                 2                  3                  4                  5
How confident are you that your answer is correct?
 
 
17. The elevator doors that Jim walked by were _______________. 
 
a. wide open b. closed 
 
Not confident 
at all
Very 
confident
1                 2                  3                  4                  5
How confident are you that your answer is correct?
 
 
18. Jim had __________________ hair 
 
a. fairly straight b. wavy/curly 
 
Not confident 
at all
Very 
confident
1                 2                  3                  4                  5
How confident are you that your answer is correct?
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19. The color of the towel that Jim handled was ________________. 
 
a. light blue b. white 
 
Not confident 
at all
Very 
confident
1                 2                  3                  4                  5
How confident are you that your answer is correct?
 
 
20. Jim and Doris hugged each other ____________. 
 
a. once b. twice 
 
Not confident 
at all
Very 
confident
1                 2                  3                  4                  5
How confident are you that your answer is correct?
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Appendix C: R273 Manipulation Check 
 
 
Thank you for participating in today’s R273 trials.  
 
During these trials we would like to know if you experienced any effects over the past hour. 
These effects may vary from person to person which is why we are interested in finding out 
how R273 affected you. 
 
A number of statements are given below. Please read each statement and circle the number 
that represents how you felt during the trial. There are no wrong or right answers – we just 
ask that you are honest. 
 
Please indicate on the scale below the extent to which your experienced each effect. 
 
 
Effect The extent to which you experienced the effect 
Not at all                                                                            Very much 
My senses were enhanced 1 2 3 4 5 
I had difficulty thinking 1 2 3 4 5 
I had an easier time remembering things 1 2 3 4 5 
My responses were quicker than normal 1 2 3 4 5 
I was able to concentrate more easily 1 2 3 4 5 
I had a hard time paying attention 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
Additional Comments: 
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Appendix D: Word Lists based on Battig and Montag (1969) norms used 
in Experiment 4 
 
List A 
iron              METAL tuna               FISH 
cotton          CLOTH oak                TREE 
Chair            FURNITURE dollar             MONEY 
apple            FRUIT ball                 TOY 
rifle              WEAPON opera              MUSIC 
water            BEVERAGE tulip               FLOWER 
robbery        CRIME tui                  BIRD 
medic           PROFESSION bus                 VEHICLE 
chemistry      SCIENCE corn                VEGETABLE 
football         SPORT pepper            SEASONING 
Skirt             CLOTHING french             LANGUAGE 
piano            INSTRUMENT sandals           SHOES 
winter           SEASON python            SNAKE 
Mars             PLANET cat                  PET 
checkers       GAME aluminium      METAL 
penguin        ANIMAL flannel           CLOTH 
fly                 INSECT table              FURNITURE 
tango            DANCE pear               FRUIT 
trout             FISH knife             WEAPON 
elm               TREE coffee            BEVERAGE 
dollar            MONEY murder          CRIME 
doll               TOY teacher          PROFESSION 
jazz               MUSIC physics           SCIENCE 
rose              FLOWER basketball       SPORT 
robin             BIRD shirt                CLOTHING 
car                VEHICLE violin              INSTRUMENT 
carrot            VEGETABLE summer          SEASON 
salt                SEASONING earth               PLANET 
english          LANGUAGE blocks             BIRD 
boots            SHOES botany            CLOTH 
cobra            SNAKE carnation        CLOTHING 
dog               PET chess              CRIME 
copper          METAL clarinet           DANCE 
Linen            CLOTH knife               FISH 
Desk             FURNITURE crow               FLOWER 
orange           FRUIT dentist            FRUIT 
pistol             WEAPON autumn           FURNITURE 
Soda              BEVERAGE german           GAME 
arson             CRIME giraffe             INSECT 
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lawyer            PROFESSION jeep                 INSTRUMENT 
biology           SCIENCE jitterbug          LANGUAGE 
baseball          SPORT loafers             METAL 
pants              CLOTHING maple              MONEY 
trumpet           INSTRUMENT mosquito         MUSIC 
spring              SEASON neptune            PET 
venus               PLANET paprika             PLANET 
rummy             GAME cent                  PROFESSION 
zebra               ANIMAL rock 'n' roll       SCIENCE 
ant                   INSECT salmon             SEASON 
waltz                DANCE socks                SEASONING 
shoplifting       SHOES sword               MONEY 
table                 SNAKE jandals              MUSIC 
spinach             SPORT flannel              PET 
copperhead      TOY fish                   PLANET 
coffee               TREE earth                 PROFESSION 
tennis               VEGETABLE dog                   SCIENCE 
tin                     VEHICLE dime                 SEASON 
wool                  WEAPON daisy                 SEASONING 
violin                 ANIMAL tea                    SHOES 
truck                  BEVERAGE classical            SNAKE 
teacher               BIRD bluejay              SPORT 
sofa                    CLOTH bee                   TOY 
summer              CLOTHING bass                  TREE 
spanish               CRIME basketball         VEGETABLE 
shirt                    DANCE ballet                VEHICLE 
rattler                  FISH aluminium        WEAPON 
puzzle                 FLOWER pepper              ANIMAL 
pine                    FRUIT waltz                 BEVERAGE 
potato                 FURNITURE venus                BIRD 
physics                GAME tuna                  CLOTH 
pear                     INSECT tulip                  CLOTHING 
oregano               INSTRUMENT trumpet             CRIME 
murder                 LANGUAGE spring                 DANCE 
monopoly             METAL soda                   FISH 
sandals                 FLOWER orange                INSTRUMENT 
rummy                  FLOWER opera                  LANGUAGE 
python                  FRUIT shotgun               TREE 
pistol                    FURNITURE sneakers             VEGETABLE 
zebra                    GAME soccer                 VEHICLE 
pants                    INSECT thyme                  WEAPON 
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List B 
 
bee             INSECT satin                   CLOTH 
ballet          DANCE bed                     FURNITURE 
bass            FISH peach                  FRUIT 
pine            TREE shotgun              WEAPON 
dime           MONEY beer                    BEVERAGE 
puzzle         TOY kidnapping          CRIME 
classical       MUSIC chef                     PROFESSION 
daisy            FLOWER geology                SCIENCE 
bluejay         BIRD soccer                  SPORT 
truck            VEHICLE dress                    CLOTHING 
potato           VEGETABLE guitar                   INSTRUMENT 
oregano         SEASONING pluto                    PLANET 
spanish          LANGUAGE backgammon        GAME 
jandals           SHOES hippo                    ANIMAL 
rattler            SNAKE hornet                  INSECT 
fish               PET shag                     DANCE 
tin                 METAL groper                  FISH 
wool              CLOTH magnolia              TREE 
sofa               FURNITURE penny                   MONEY 
banana           FRUIT crayons                 TOY 
sword             WEAPON country                 MUSIC 
tea                  BEVERAGE pansy                   FLOWER 
shoplifting      CRIME eagle                    BIRD 
dentist             PROFESSION bicycle                 VEHICLE 
botany             SCIENCE broccoli               VEGETABLE 
tennis              SPORT rosemary              SEASONING 
socks               CLOTHING italian                   LANGUAGE 
clarinet            INSTRUMENT sneakers               SHOES 
autumn           SEASON moccasin              SNAKE 
neptune           PLANET hamster                PET 
chess               GAME thyme                   SEASONING 
giraffe              ANIMAL oak                       MONEY 
mosquito         INSECT nickel                   MUSIC 
jitterbug           DANCE linen                     PET 
salmon             FISH lawyer                   PLANET 
maple               TREE french                   PROFESSION 
quarter              MONEY desk                      SCIENCE 
blocks               TOY corn                      SEASON 
rock 'n' roll        MUSIC copper                  SEASONING 
carnation           FLOWER cat                        SHOES 
crow                  BIRD tui                        SNAKE 
jeep                   VEHICLE bus                       SPORT 
spinach              VEGETABLE biology                 TOY 
paprika              SEASONING baseball               TREE 
german              LANGUAGE ball                      VEGETABLE 
loafers               SHOES arson                   VEHICLE 
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copperhead        SNAKE ant                      WEAPON 
bird                  PET apple                ANIMAL 
gold                  METAL boots               BEVERAGE 
car                    BIRD salt                  SPORT 
carrot               CLOTH skirt                TOY 
chair                 CLOTHING tango              TREE 
checkers           CRIME trout               VEGETABLE 
chemistry          DANCE water              VEHICLE 
cobra                FISH winter             WEAPON 
cotton               FLOWER backgammon  ANIMAL 
policeman         FRUIT bed                  BEVERAGE 
dog                   FURNITURE beer                  BIRD 
mars                 GAME broccoli            CLOTH 
dollar                INSECT chef                  CLOTHING 
elm                   INSTRUMENT country            CRIME 
doll                   LANGUAGE crayons            DANCE 
fly                     METAL dress                FISH 
football            MONEY eagle                FLOWER 
iron                  MUSIC geology           FRUIT 
jazz                  PET gold                FURNITURE 
english             PLANET groper            GAME 
penguin           PROFESSION guitar              INSECT 
piano               SCIENCE hamster          INSTRUMENT 
rifle                  SEASON hippo              LANGUAGE 
robbery           SEASONING hornet            METAL 
robin              SHOES italian             MONEY 
rose                SNAKE kidnapping     MUSIC 
magnolia         PET rosemary         SNAKE 
moccasin         PLANET satin               SPORT 
bicycle            PROFESSION shag               TOY 
pansy              SCIENCE autumn          INSTRUMENT 
peach             SEASON guitar            GAME 
penny            SEASONING soccer           SPORT 
pluto             SHOES  
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Appendix E: Example of the Post-Experimental Prospective Memory 
Manipulation Check 
 
Post-Experimental Questionnaire 
 
The purpose of this questionnaire is to check your understanding of the experiment you just 
completed.  Please answer each of the following questions thoroughly. 
 
1. What were you supposed to do during the Word-Category task? 
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________ 
2. Do you remember being asked to press a specific key when you saw a particular 
word?  (Circle one.) 
 
YES  NO 
3. If yes, then: 
a) What was the key? _____ 
b) What was the word? _______________ 
4. On a scale from 1 – 5, how important did you perceive the Word-Category task 
to be? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  
Not at all       Moderately             Very 
Important        Important          Important 
 
5. On a scale from 1 – 5, how important was the memory task (remembering to 
press a specific key when you saw your target word)? 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
 
Not at all       Moderately             Very 
Important        Important          Important 
6. On a scale from 1 – 5, rate the extent to which you thought about pressing the 
“Q” key during the Word-Category task. 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
Never       Occasionally       Constantly 
 
 
 
 
 
